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INTRODUCTION 
There has been a gradual but clearly identifiable legal revolution in favor 
of supporting children’s rights and promoting children’s best interests.1 Chil-
dren, who were once treated more like property than humanity, and used as a 
means to punish parents and channel social norms through penalties on illegit-
imacy,2 are now the focus of family law judicial determinations,3 the subject of 
international conventions,4 and the focus of much legislative and societal con-
cern.5 Every jurisdiction of the United States focuses on the best interests of the 
child in determining custody as between formal parents and beyond.6 It is the 
                                                        
1  See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Children, Chimps, and Rights: Arguments from “Margin-
al” Cases, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 6–17 (2013) (providing a historical analysis of the develop-
ment of children’s rights); Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80 
MINN. L. REV. 267, 270 (1995); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A World Fit for Children Is a 
World Fit for Everyone: Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 817, 
836 (2009). See also infra Part I.A for a discussion of the progress in the law towards re-
specting children’s interests. 
2  See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurtur-
ing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1271, 1278 (2005); Stuart N. Hart, From Property to Per-
son Status: Historical Perspective on Children’s Rights, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 53, 53 
(1991); Andrew Schepard, Kvell[ing] for Family Court Review on Its Fiftieth Birthday, 51 
FAM. CT. REV. 1, 1 (2013); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-
Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1807–09 (1993). 
3  See Annette Ruth Appell, The Pre-political Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, 46 
HOUS. L. REV. 703, 708 (2009); Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who Can’t or 
Won’t Direct Counsel: Best Interests Lawyering or No Lawyer at All?, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 
382–83 (2011); Daniel W. Shuman, Troxel v. Granville and the Boundaries of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 67, 68 (2003); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Proper-
ty to Personhood: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING 
POVERTY, 313, 315 (1998). 
4  See, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC]. 
5  Atwood, supra note 3, at 382–85, 410–15. 
6  CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CHILD 2–4 (Nov. 2012), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs 
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governing principle with regard to child support guidelines and litigation, adop-
tion, placement after abuse, neglect proceedings, and emancipation.7 Interna-
tionally, many countries have ratified the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (“CRC”), which creates, or at least reflects, a worldwide normative in-
sistence on the use of the best interests of the child for determining custody and 
in allowing international adoptions, as well as for other legal determinations 
regarding children.8 The CRC delineates numerous children’s rights and focus-
es on child support and the right to know one’s biological heritage and be 
raised by one’s parents.9 International adoption, the use of assisted reproductive 
technologies (“ART”), and many other fields of law involving children, have 
all been influenced by best interests inquiries and discussions of children’s 
rights.10 There are inevitable shortcomings in the application of this standard 
where it may be argued that children’s interests are being ignored and are not as 
influential as they appear,11 but the conceptual movement is clear and progress 
has been made. 
However, the question remains, how far can this emphasis on children be 
extended, and, if one wants to take children’s rights and interests seriously as a 
valid cause for advocacy, are there any relevant considerations in advocating 
for children beyond what is determined to be best for an individual child?12 In 
                                                                                                                                
/best_interest.pdf (discussing that all states have statutes requiring that the child’s best inter-
ests be considered whenever a court makes decisions regarding a child). 
7  See Bernstein v. Bernstein, 498 So. 2d 1270, 1273 (1986 Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (stating that 
the best interest of the child is predominant in establishing the amount of child support); Sue 
Nations, Louisiana’s Child Support Guidelines: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 LA. L. REV. 
1057, 1084 (1990) (arguing that “providing for the best interest of the child is always the 
ideal [goal] sought by child support judgments”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, 
Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 
77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 69 (2014). 
8  CRC, supra note 4, art. 3, ¶ 1.  
9  Id. arts. 6–9, 12–16, 23–28, 30–32, 40. 
10  See Lisa Myers, Preserving the Best Interests of the World’s Children: Implementing the 
Hague Treaty on Intercountry Adoption Through Public-Private Partnerships, 6 RUTGERS 
J.L. PUB. POL’Y 780, 782 (2009) (“Without compromising the best interests of children, the 
Hague Treaty struck a balance between hard-and-fast rules and flexible implementation op-
tions left to individual governments’ discretion.”); see also Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, In-
ternational Asian Adoption: In the Best Interest of the Child?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 
343, 343 (2004) (discussing that international adoption legislation and practice purports to 
consider the best interest of the child, specifically referring to the Hague Convention and 
United Nations); Molly S. Marx, Comment, Whose Best Interests Does it Really Serve? A 
Critical Examination of Romania’s Recent Self-Serving International Adoption Policies, 21 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 373, 390 (2007) (recommending the European Union suspend Roma-
nia’s admission because Romania clearly fails to consider the best interest of the child as 
required by the United Nations). 
11  See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 849–54 
(2004). 
12  See Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 518–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (Herndon, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that a parent’s religious affiliation is only relevant in a custody determina-
tion to the extent that it affects the best interests of the child, and here the mother’s religious 
affiliation would require her to isolate her son from his father, which would not be in the 
15 NEV. L.J. 236 - LAUFER-UKELES.DOCX 4/1/2015  4:06 PM 
Fall 2014] CAREGIVERS’ RIGHTS 239 
particular, I have written a number of articles advancing the interests of care-
givers and arguing for the revaluing of the caregiver role in family law.13 In 
these articles, I argue for revaluing caregiving work in order to provide more 
compensation and legal rights to those who care for dependents. These argu-
ments have been critiqued for their focus on caregivers in isolation of chil-
dren.14 Is giving rights to caregivers, or credence to the care work they provide, 
a potential threat to children’s rights? 
At first blush, it would seem that caregivers’ interests would be part of any 
child-centered inquiry. Indeed, any best interests inquiry in determining custo-
dy will take into account children’s relationships with their caregivers. On the 
other hand, caregiver interests may seem completely irrelevant as the children’s 
rights inquiry may seem most pressing when relationships between parent and 
child break down, as in neglect and abuse proceedings. However, there are 
many more inquires that fall between those poles, where the issue of the sever-
ability of caregivers’ and children’s interests is central. This occurs particularly 
in custody law, which is the focus of this article. I will discuss a number of ex-
amples of these hard cases in this article. One common issue of contention is 
whether children should have a right to relationships with third parties other 
than parents, such as grandparents, when parents object.15 In these types of cus-
tody determinations, the extent to which the court should defer to the prefer-
ences of parents in primary caregiving relationships with children, as opposed 
to the many other factors involved in a best interests inquiry, is regularly dis-
                                                                                                                                
child’s best interests); JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 11–12 
(2006) [hereinafter DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS]. See generally James G. Dwyer, Parents’ 
Self-Determination and Children’s Custody: A New Analytical Framework for State Struc-
turing of Children’s Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 79 (2012) [hereinafter Dwyer, Parents’ 
Self-Determination] (arguing that consideration of fairness to caregivers undermines the fo-
cus on children in custody disputes); Judith T. Younger, Responsible Parents and Good 
Children, 14 LAW & INEQ. 489, 518–20 (1996); Marcia Zug, Should I Stay or Should I Go: 
Why Immigrant Reunification Decisions Should Be Based on the Best Interest of the Child, 
2011 BYU L. REV. 1139 1161–64 (arguing for a best interests standard in deciding when to 
deport citizen children with parents and a weakening of parental rights in this context); Ra-
chel M. Dufault, Comment, Bone Marrow Donations by Children: Rethinking the Legal 
Framework in Light of Curran v. Bosze, 24 CONN. L. REV. 211, 237 (1991) (arguing that the 
best interests standards suffers from the flaw of not allowing for altruistic choices); Lauren 
C. Miele, Note, Big Love or Big Problem: Should Polygamous Relationships Be a Factor in 
Determining Child Custody, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 105 (2008) (arguing that because polyg-
amy remains illegal and because it has a general negative impact upon the children involved, 
it will almost always remain a factor courts can consider when awarding custody). 
13  See generally Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the 
Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2008) [hereinafter Laufer-
Ukeles, Selective Recognition]; Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Money, Caregiving, and Kinship: 
Should Paid Caregivers Be Allowed to Obtain De Facto Parental Status?, 74 MO. L. REV. 
25 (2009); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: 
Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419 
(2013). 
14  Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra note 12, at 92–93. 
15  See infra Part IV.A. 
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puted. Indeed, that the primary caregiver presumption is not the law in any 
state, but rather it is the best interests standard which dominates custody pro-
ceedings, demonstrates the potential separation inherent in custody disputes. 
Relocation and modification proceedings in particular are often fraught with 
confusion on how much to take into account the ongoing relationship or to fo-
cus on a renewed vision of what might be best for children.16 Finally, in the 
context of education, health, and religious rights, as well as other types of pa-
rental choices, the relevance and strength of caregiver rights and the extent to 
which the state should interfere, overrule, or punish parental prerogatives is of-
ten at issue.17 
The pitting of children’s rights against caregiver rights is a great contempo-
rary dilemma about the clash of rights. The clash of caregiver and children’s 
rights joins a range of other dichotomies in family law that seem to create un-
ending tension: father’s rights versus mother’s rights, parents’ rights versus 
children’s rights, state interests versus family privacy, and cultural identity ver-
sus the determinations of best available care. Moreover, if a focus on caregivers 
harms children’s interests and a focus on children harms caregivers then the 
feminist movement for protecting the value of care seems to be potentially in 
opposition to children’s rights.18 The power of this critique is that it uses the 
methods of feminist theory, seeking to protect the vulnerable and to uncover 
and uproot hidden power structures, to undermine the rights of the traditionally 
and still predominately female caregivers who feminists have sought to protect. 
To clarify, the question of caregiver rights is distinguishable from parental 
rights because not all caregivers are parents and not all parents are caregivers.19 
Moreover, caregiver rights refer specifically to actions of caring for children 
                                                        
16  See infra Part IV.C. 
17  See Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra note 12, at 82–86. 
18  See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 70–89 (1995) (arguing for valuing the caregiving 
“mothering” relationships that provide needed care for children); JOAN WILLIAMS, 
UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 13–39, 
124 (2000) (arguing that society should reconsider the role of care by breaking down the 
ideal worker paradigm that does not integrate the need to care for children); see also 
BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A 
PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 198–208 (1989) (discussing the advent of paid childcare fostered by 
women entering the workplace). 
19  I largely put aside questions of parental rights versus children’s rights in this article and 
instead focus on the need to include caregiver interests within the discussion of children’s 
rights themselves. However, descriptions of the tension between parents’ rights and chil-
dren’s are numerous. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 715, 726 (2013); Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood, 79 
BROOK. L. REV. 525 (2014); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 637, 638–40 (2006); Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2012); 
Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 825. 
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and not to parental rights to treat children at their own discretion short of a 
finding of unfitness.20 
Some have argued, including James G. Dwyer, that to account for chil-
dren’s rights, children’s interests should be the only consideration in custody 
hearings; thus, parental rights, prerogatives, and liberty interests would be 
completely irrelevant.21 Because of the focus on the need to protect children, it 
is argued that the state should step in and enforce children’s rights in a manner 
analogous to the state’s protection of adult rights.22 Therefore, to take chil-
dren’s rights seriously, it is necessary to curtail parental rights by allowing the 
state to intervene and protect children’s rights based solely on objective “best 
interests” criteria, as determined by the state in judicial hearings. 
In this article, I explain how the separation of the interests of children from 
the interests of caregivers through the use of the best interests standard is prob-
lematic and ineffectually furthers children’s interests. Rather, support for chil-
dren needs to focus on supporting relationships between children and caregiv-
ers. I will argue that the use of the best interests standard to isolate children’s 
interests from caregiver interests has three primary interlinking aspects that 
make the standard weak and ineffectual as the primary means for advocating on 
behalf of children. First, the best interests analysis protects a variety of chil-
dren’s interests, such as: quasi-civil rights; liberty interests similar to, but more 
limited than, adult liberties; interests in being cared for by parents or other 
caregivers; and interests in protection from the state. These interests often man-
date conflicting treatments and are hard to resolve by merely asking the state to 
determine what is “best.” Second, due to these conflicting interests and the dif-
ficulties of predicting what is “best,” the state is nevertheless called on to de-
cide what is best without meaningful guidance from the standard; thus, courts 
rely on majoritarian values, preferring simplistic findings, such as nuclear fami-
lies that are financially stable and well-educated, as opposed to the complex re-
alities. Third, ultimately, because judicial determinations are made in a manner 
that gives state perspectives and interests special weight, the needs of caregiv-
ers and the children for whom they care are too often treated as separate inquir-
ies as courts aim to provide an individualistic and isolated perspective of best 
interests in the liberal tradition. 
I make this argument against the use of the best interests standard and the 
separation between caregivers and children it entails, not in deference to paren-
tal rights and prerogatives because parents are better situated than the state to 
                                                        
20  See infra notes 31–39 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the problems 
that have occurred in the legal treatment of children under a parental rights doctrine. 
21  Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra note 12, at 82–86. 
22  DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 131–36 (“As a matter of rational moral 
consistency, therefore, we should conclude on utilitarian grounds that in all cases in which 
the state structures children’s relational lives, and in which children are not themselves in the 
best position to judge where their interests lie, the state should act as proxy for the chil-
dren . . . . In short, it is simply unavoidable that the state will play a decisive role in the lives 
of nonautonomous persons, and it does so quite clearly today.”). 
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know what is best for their children as others have argued,23 or because we 
need to heed children’s own isolated interests and voices more emphatically 
and in more creative ways,24 but because an individualized account of best in-
terests that focuses on children alone fundamentally misses the nature of chil-
dren’s needs and vulnerabilities, and the nature of the relationships upon which 
they depend. Children are caught between dependency and agency; thus, nei-
ther pursing children’s rights through reliance on parents, nor through reliance 
on a child’s own voice sufficiently captures the nature of the children’s inquiry. 
Rather, to promote children’s interests the focus should be on supporting the 
relationships children need to thrive. 
I will argue for a conceptual rejoining of care and the caregiver and then 
translate this union into applicable legal doctrine to fight the tide of separation, 
the liberal emphasis on individualism, and the focus on the clash of rights in 
modern family law. Instead of a focus on an individualistic best interests stand-
ard to support children, which is fraught with uncertainty and ambiguity and 
subject to bias, I argue that in pursuing children’s rights, judges and legislators 
should focus on supporting these caregiver-child relationships. The child and 
his or her custodians have an inseparable interdependent relationship and this 
relational nature of children’s lives cannot be ignored; the caregiver and the 
care that a child needs cannot be completely separated.25 Moreover, these rela-
tionships that are necessitated by children’s dependency are fundamental to 
children’s needs.26 Granted, when there is evidence of abuse and neglect, the 
relationship between children and caregivers must be questioned and their 
rights potentially terminated. However, short of abuse and neglect, the rights of 
children and caregivers need to be considered in parallel, viewed as inextrica-
bly intertwined, and in a manner that protects both children and caregivers. 
That does not mean that caregiver rights will always overwhelm what is 
deemed best for children or vice versa; rather, the importance of the relation-
                                                        
23  See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity 
Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 358–59; Emily Buss, “Parental” 
Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647–49, 656 (2002). Cf. Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers 
and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683 (2001) (arguing for parental 
rights doctrine to maintain diverse family forms and cultural identities). 
24  See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1810–41. 
25  See Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children’s 
Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 14–21, 24 (1986) [hereinafter Minow, Rights for the Next 
Generation]; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 
297–98, 315 (1988); Martha Minow, “Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:” To-
ward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 894; Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon 
Shanley, Relational Rights and Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political 
Theory and Law, 11 HYPATIA 4, 20–26 (1996); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of 
Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 
617–22 (1986). 
26  Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2166–67 
(2011); Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Transitional Rights, LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. (forth-
coming 2015) (manuscript at 21-30), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392570. 
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ship demands consideration of how to best support children and their caregivers 
in a relational and inseparable context. Sometimes caregivers will have to be 
restricted or have their prerogatives overridden, but any such decision must 
keep the ongoing relationship between child and potentially multiple caregivers 
front and center. 
This shift in focus away from an individualized account of children’s rights 
versus caregiver rights, and towards a relational, relationship-based perspective 
on children’s rights will significantly impact how we consider children’s rights 
and the legal doctrines affecting children. In particular, I will present a relation-
ship-centered series of legal rules for adjudicating custody decisions. I argue 
for recognition and preservation of a variety of types of relationships, including 
recognition of functional parenthood and third-party care, the use of presump-
tions to preserve relationships and to replace best interest inquires, and reloca-
tion and modification rules that reflect an emphasis on relationship preservation 
and stability. 
This article will proceed in four main parts. Beginning in Part I, I will dis-
sect the nature of children’s rights and the relationship between children’s 
rights and the best interests standard. This background is essential given the 
confusion and conflation of the concepts of children’s rights, interests, and best 
interests. 
Then, in Part II, I will critique the use of the best interests standard as the 
primary vehicle in modern law in advancing children’s interests. I argue that 
the indeterminacy and ambiguity of the best interests analysis reflects internal 
conflicts based on the different types of children’s rights comprising this stand-
ard, such as dependency rights, parental privacy, or civil liberties. Lumping 
these different types of interests together creates ambiguity and uncertainty in 
applying best interests that cannot be readily resolved. Thus, despite the stand-
ard’s persistence, I add to the scholarly critique that the best interests standard 
is not a rich and meaningful basis for legal decision-making.27 
I will then provide some examples of how best interests analyses are often 
made unintelligible by differing interpretations of the meaning of children’s 
rights and interests in complex legal determinations. I argue that the use of best 
                                                        
27  See Katherine Hunt Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection, 34 FAM. L.Q. 
421, 426–27 (2000); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Custody Through the Eyes of the Child, 36 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 299, 300 (2011) (“[D]ue to the malleability and ambiguity of the standard, 
determining best interests has proved to be dependent on factors other than a child’s needs 
[including] biases of judges [and] preconceptions regarding socio-economic class, gender 
and race . . . . While the best interests standard is intended to achieve that which is best for 
the child concerned, it is also a broad and ambiguous concept subject to manipulation and an 
unlimited number of interpretations.” (footnotes omitted)); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 229 (1975) (“[D]etermination of what is ‘best’ or ‘least detrimental’ 
for a particular child is usually indeterminate and speculative. . . . [O]ur society today lacks 
any clear-cut consensus about the values to be used in determining what is ‘best’ or ‘least 
detrimental.’ ”). 
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interests is not an objective measure, but instead relies on majoritarian visions 
of optimal care imposed by the state in an attempt to isolate what is best for 
children; the state’s analysis uses simple proxies for complex analyses and un-
dermines family privacy rights and children’s attachment to caregivers. These 
examples demonstrate how current law, which attempts to isolate what is best 
for children, in fact separates children’s interests from caregiver interests in a 
manner that may be harmful to children and only accentuates the tension be-
tween children’s right to be raised by their parents and their right for protection 
from the state. 
Next, in Part III, I will consider the nature of caregiver rights and interests 
and how they are indelibly intertwined with children’s rights and interests. I 
will describe how such individualist perspectives on parental and children’s 
rights warp and obfuscate the real issues in promoting children’s rights: sup-
porting interdependent relationships. I will use Martha Albertson Fineman’s 
vulnerability theory28 and Jennifer Nedelsky’s relational rights theory29 to ar-
gue for a theoretical framework for considering caregiver rights in tandem with 
children’s rights. This relational perspective is different from a state interven-
tionist or parental rights perspective as it focuses on the need to support rela-
tionships as opposed to giving individuals or the state power to make decisions 
regarding children. 
Finally, in Part IV, I will demonstrate how this altered perspective affects 
legislative policy and legal decision making in the context of custody law. First, 
I will argue for an approach to custody that focuses on supporting a variety of 
care relationships, such as primary, secondary, formal, and functional. Children 
have a right to have their supportive relationships maintained, even if primary 
parents object, and differentiation and hierarchy can ease the tension and allow 
different kinds of relationships to coexist. Second, I will argue from a relational 
children’s rights perspective for the use of presumptions when possible to avoid 
using the best interests standard. Lastly, I will consider the law of relocation 
and modification, and provide principles derived from the interdependency of 
children and caregivers, while focusing on supporting multiple care relation-
ships. 
I. DISSECTING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND INTERESTS 
In this part, I will address the nature of modern advocacy for children and 
its development. I will first provide a brief background on the fluctuations in 
the law regarding children’s advocacy. I will then describe the nature of chil-
dren’s rights, and the nature of the best interests standard. 
                                                        
28  See generally VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW 
AND POLITICS (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013). 
29  See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, 
AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011). 
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A. From Rights to Interests and Back Again 
Children’s interests were once completely subsumed under the rights and 
interests of parents. Parents were entitled to use their children for labor and col-
lect their wages, and could punish their children harshly, even to the extent of 
death in several states.30 Children were considered the property of fathers who 
would retain custody as a matter of right.31 Even when custody could be award-
ed to either parent, the dispute concerned only the rights of two competing 
adults, and children were used as a punishment or reward for parental behav-
ior.32 Children were also used as a means to “punish” the sins of parents in laws 
surrounding illegitimacy.33 Illegitimate children were historically severely dis-
criminated against and the state justified this by the fact that the parents con-
ceived the children out of wedlock. Illegitimate children did not have rights to 
child support or inheritance, nor did they have equal access to civil rights.34 
When children did not have parental care, they would be placed with foster 
families, but the goal was simply to find a family to care for them and there 
                                                        
30  See Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 314. 
31  Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children’s Rights: The Destruction and Promise of Family, 
1993 BYU L. REV. 497, 502. 
32  Modern case law has since reversed the course of punishing parents by refusing to award 
custody. See, e.g., Ashwell v. Ashwell, 286 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (“[I]n 
determining where custody of children shall lie the courts are not engaged in a disciplinary 
action to punish parents for their shortcomings as individuals”); Hayes v. Gallacher, 972 
P.2d 1138, 1142 (Nev. 1999); Sims v. Sims, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (Nev. 1993) (holding custody 
determinations should be made in best interests of children, not to punish parents); see also 
Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that purpose of cus-
tody decision is not to punish parent); Sarah Abramowicz, Beyond Family Law, 63 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 293, 309 (2012); Kerry Abrams, Immigration Status and the Best Interests of 
the Child Standard, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 97 (2006); Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Re-
sponsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 
U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1187 (1999). 
33  See Taylor Gay, Comment, All in the Family: Examining Louisiana’s Faulty Birth Order-
Based Discrimination, 73 LA. L. REV. 295, 303–04 (2012) (discussing how illegitimate chil-
dren, born to unmarried parents, were discriminated against by the government until 1968 
when the United States Supreme Court held that denying children rights based on legitimacy 
is unconstitutional); see also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding “it is invid-
ious to discriminate” against illegitimate children by precluding them from recovering dam-
ages for the wrongful death of their mother); Cara C. Orr, Comment, Married to a Myth: 
How Welfare Reform Violates the Constitutional Rights of Poor Single Mothers, 34 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 211, 218 (2005) (reviewing discrimination based on illegitimacy and how the Ameri-
can legal system has historically discriminated against children born out of wedlock). 
34  Jayna Morse Cacioppo, Note, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity: Should Biology 
Play a Role in Determining Who Can Be a Legal Father?, 38 IND. L. REV. 479, 483 (2005) 
(reviewing the history of illegitimacy and how a child born to unwed parents had no right to 
child support); see Browne Lewis, Children of Men: Balancing the Inheritance Rights of 
Marital and Non-Marital Children, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) (illegitimate children 
were considered “bastards” and not entitled to inheritance rights). 
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was little oversight over the conditions of the homes or the suitability of place-
ment.35 
The first revolution in advocacy for children was the switch from children 
as property to children as interest bearers.36 Under the “fiduciary” model, chil-
dren are treated as persons in need of protection. This is still consistent with a 
strong view of parental rights, as a “fiduciary exercises great authority and 
power.”37 Accordingly, children’s interests have become the focus of legisla-
tion, case law, and international treaties.38 Children went from being viewed as 
parental property to individuals with needs and interests that need “steward-
ship.”39 Today, children’s interests have become relevant both in the context of 
child protection—such as in cases of abusive or neglectful parents—and in re-
solving disputes between parents. Laws that explicitly punished parents through 
custody awards are defunct,40 and almost all discrimination based on illegiti-
macy unconstitutional.41 
Although other constitutional factors may still be considered in determin-
ing custody,42 the best interests of the child standard is dominant in custody de-
cisions.43 Best interests analyses almost always include the relevance of chil-
dren’s voices, particularly with regard to older children, but also take into 
account the fact that minor children need more than mere autonomy, they must 
also be taken care of. Ultimately, best interests analyses allow the state, judges, 
parents, and other surrogates to determine what is best for children. 
The second revolution in advocacy for children is the growing prevalence 
of children’s rights. Children’s rights advocates are more focused on pitting 
children’s needs against parental rights or state interests, creating a cocoon of 
                                                        
35  See BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE 96–99 (2008) (demonstrating 
harsh conditions for children in the foster care system); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE 
PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 169–71 (1994) (discussing 
the way children were valued for their useful labor in the foster care and adoption system). 
36  See Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 313–14. 
37  Id. at 314. 
38  See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
39  See Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1755–56; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Of Babies, 
Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning Parenthood in Irrational Action, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 2493, 2519–20 (1995); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 
VA. L. REV. 2401, 2401 (1995). 
40  See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text for a discussion of laws that treated chil-
dren as property. 
41  See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a state law 
that barred illegitimate children from bringing wrongful death suits); but see Nguyen v. INS, 
533 U.S. 53, 58–59 (2001) (holding that children born out of wedlock must have paternity of 
U.S. citizen legally acknowledged by age eighteen or lose ability to gain U.S. citizenship). 
42  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
43  See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making 
About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 911 (2003); infra Part II.A. 
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protection that belongs to children alone.44 Stewardship, as a conceptual model 
in which parents make decisions on behalf of children, is called into question. 
Those who focus on promoting children’s rights as human rights tend to be 
more focused on listening to children’s voices than on allowing others to make 
decisions on their behalf.45 However, because children cannot always articulate 
their own liberty interests and their immaturity compromises their autonomy, 
typical rights language, which usually focuses on individual autonomy and ra-
tionality, is a difficult fit for children.46 Nonetheless, rights need not depend on 
full autonomy.47 The state can protect children’s rights, and parents and other 
adults can respect those rights, even if children are not fully autonomous.48 
Children’s rights advocates focus on how children—without full liberty and 
constitutional rights—still maintain human, civil, and constitutional rights that 
deserve to be protected from interference. 
The source of such rights may be based on ethical notions of human and 
civil rights, international conventions, or domestic constitutions.49 Indeed, chil-
dren’s rights are canonized in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”), which many countries have signed.50 However, despite the name of 
the document, there are disagreements on how rights-oriented versus best-
interests-oriented the CRC is in reality.51 
“Rights talk” regarding children is quite widespread in child advocacy lit-
erature.52 Although it is often criticized as creating unnecessary tension,53 most 
                                                        
44  See, e.g., Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 
1860, 1867–71 (1987). 
45  See, e.g., Shulamit Almog & Ariel L. Bendor, The UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child Meets the American Constitution: Towards a Supreme Law of the World, 11 INT’L J. 
CHILD. RTS. 273, 277–79 (2004). 
46  See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Res-
ervations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights”, 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 644–56. 
47  See Minow, supra note 44, at 1882–1891 (“Autonomy, then, is not a precondition for any 
individual’s exercise of rights. The only precondition is that the community is willing to al-
low the individual to make claims and to participate in the shifting of boundaries.”). 
48  Id. 
49  For different moral approaches to the source of rights, see infra notes 130–32 and accom-
panying text. 
50  See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
51  See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Kathryn A. Johnson, The United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child: Empowering Parents to Protect Their Children’s Rights, 
in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN? 7–18 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen Worthington, 
eds., 2009) (arguing that the treatise incorporates parental rights and best interests in a man-
ner that makes it unthreatening to parental rights advocates); Almog & Bender, supra note 
45, at 277 (arguing that the CRC grants rights to children that frequently conflict with both 
parental rights and judicial discretion, focusing on the rights of the child attached from par-
ent or state). 
52  See, e.g., Minow, supra note 44, at 1868–69 (“Advocates for children typically make 
claims about children’s rights, despite prevailing rules of parental and judicial discretion, in 
an effort to challenge public complacency and to yield particular results in particular cas-
es.”). 
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believe it is necessary to counteract strong notions of parental rights by arguing 
that children deserve the same level of protection.54 Largely due to this per-
ceived tension between parental rights and children’s rights, and the resulting 
threat to the former,55 the United States has not signed the CRC.56 Accordingly, 
children’s rights talk in U.S. case law is relatively uncommon when compared 
to other countries. Although balancing rights is a common phenomenon, many 
believe a discussion of children’s rights is inappropriate and an unjustifiable 
intrusion on parental rights.57 
The terms “best interests,” “children’s interests,” and “children’s rights” 
are thrown around with abandon. Using the term “rights” as opposed to “inter-
ests” is often viewed as a strategic choice in order to combat the strength of pa-
rental rights rather than a factual distinction.58 Legal scholars and judges move 
swiftly from one to the other. However, there are real and important differences 
between the terms. Joseph Raz described the relationship between rights and 
interests: “ ‘X has a right’ if and only if . . . an aspect of X’s well-being (his in-
terest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a du-
ty.”59 Interests reflect general advocacy on behalf of children’s well-being. One 
can have a desire that is not really in one’s interests (does not promote their 
well-being), although that may be a paternalistic perspective. A child has an in-
terest in having his voice heard, but his voiced desires may not support his in-
terests; thus, the state or a parent must step in to make decisions on the child’s 
                                                                                                                                
53  See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1841–43 (“Rights talk, when repeated often 
enough in connection with the power of parents over children, has the potential to undermine 
a generist perspective on adult authority. It keeps neighbors and even family at arm’s length, 
excuses the community from accepting real responsibility for the plight of ‘other people’s 
children’ ” (quoting W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: HOW 
AMERICANS FAIL THEIR CHILDREN 78–85 (1982))). 
54  See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Are You My Mother?”: Conceptualizing Chil-
dren’s Identity Rights in Transracial Adoptions, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 107, 109 
(1995) (“Wary as I am of the destructive potential of ‘rights talk,’ I have chosen in other 
writings to consciously adopt a discourse of ‘needs-based rights’ to describe children’s so-
called interests. I do so because of my conclusion that, in a rights-oriented legal culture, 
children need more than the weak reed of a claim to ‘interests’ if they are to make their 
needs and voices heard.”). 
55  See Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 315 (“The provision of human rights is not a zero sum 
game; acknowledging that children have human rights serves to strengthen, rather than to 
diminish, the human rights of their parents.”). 
56  Id. at 313. 
57  Id. 
58  See, e.g., DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 12–13; Annette Ruth Appell, 
Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141, 153 (2004); 
Minow, supra note 44, at 1867 (discussing various ways rights talk is used and pointing to 
an aspirations incentive to use “rights talk” even after rights claims have failed). 
59  JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 166 (1986); accord Alon Harel, Theories of 
Rights, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 191, 192 
(Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005); Alon Harel, Whose Home Is It? 
Reflections on the Palestinians’ Interest in Return, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L., 333, 339–
40 (2004). 
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behalf. Although we allow adults to follow their own autonomous desires, we 
are more cautious when it comes to children due to their immaturity. 
A right is a tool for achieving interests. When an interest is so weighty as 
to create a duty in others, it is a protected interest that becomes a right. Thus, 
the rights discourse should be preserved for actual rights that, by definition, re-
quire a strong interest and an interest holder. However, rights should not be 
used to protect all of children’s potential interests; rather, rights should encom-
pass a small core of interests that have clear sources—constitutional, ethical, or 
based on international treaties. 
People disagree on what promotes children’s interests, and some amount of 
experimentation may be necessary and justified. However, children’s rights 
create a necessary protective zone that must be upheld unless a rare and com-
pelling reason exists to outweigh such rights. Encompassing rights within the 
broader concept of interests weakens the power of children’s rights and pre-
vents advocates from pursuing interests in a variety of coherent ways according 
to the circumstances. Therefore, children would benefit from a more differenti-
ated use of both rights and interests. 
I will use both “interests” and “rights” in this article as tools to promote 
child advocacy; however, although I am stuck with the mixed and complex us-
es of these terms in the literature and 
case law, and thus I will continue to 
use them in flexible ways, ideally 
these terms connote different con-
cepts and are not completely inter-
changeable.60 However, the term 
“rights” can be used to refer both to 
the rights it denotes and to the related 
interests that support them.61 There-
fore, in the following discussion of 
different categories of rights, one 
must understand that there is a broad 
range of interests to support each 
right. In the next part, I will analyze 
the different components of chil-
dren’s rights and interests and then 
discuss the use of the best interests 
standard. 
                                                        
60  This conflation of rights and interests undoubtedly causes confusion, so I will do my best 
to be clear in the context of this article. But, as I am often dependent on others’ use of the 
terms, and for the sake of simplicity, they will have to be understood somewhat fluidly and 
flexibly despite the different definitions I argue that we should attribute to these terms. 
61  See Figure 1 for a pictorial depiction of the relationship between children’s rights, chil-
dren’s interests, and state and parental interests. 
FIG. 1: COMPONENTS OF CHILD ADVOCACY 
15 NEV. L.J. 236 - LAUFER-UKELES.DOCX 4/1/2015  4:06 PM 
250 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:236 
B. The Three Categories of Children’s Rights: Quasi-Civil Rights, the Right 
to Familial Privacy, and the Right to Adequate Care 
 The term “children’s rights” is used in a variety of ways, based on a varie-
ty of sources,62 and stands for substantively different kinds of rights. First, chil-
dren have two kinds of rights that can be at odds with each other: civil rights 
and dependency rights.63 What Annette Appell terms “quasi-civil rights” are 
freedoms from state or parental interference, such as rights of reproduction, 
marriage, citizenship, privacy, cultural identity, and so forth.64 These rights are 
“quasi” because they mirror adult civil rights, but are much narrower and more 
limited.65 Dependency rights are the rights to be cared for by the state or by 
parents, the right to be parented and cared for and to have one’s basic needs ful-
filled.66 These rights are specific to children, who are in need of care. These 
rights involve the freedom from abuse and neglect and the social welfare of 
children. However, they have little to do with freedoms and liberty.67 Thus, 
there is tension in the notion of children’s rights when referring to their de-
pendency and need for care and their limited liberty rights.68 
These so-called “dependency rights” can be further divided into two sub-
categories: the right to be parented by one’s own legal parents in the form of 
familial privacy, and the right to state protection as a means of assuring ade-
quate care for children.69 These different dependency interests should not be 
lumped together as they can conflict. The first set of rights is based on the be-
lief that children’s care is best provided by parents; thus, children have a right 
to such care without interference from the state. The second set of rights is 
based on the need for state interference with parental relationships to protect 
children or to care for children when parents are not willing or able to provide 
the necessary care. 
All three categories of children’s rights assume different primary voices in 
any resulting conflict and different actors in assuring children’s rights. In the 
case of quasi-civil rights, the child is the primary actor seeking liberty rights 
from the state and parents are either not involved, involved only in supporting 
the child in achieving those rights,70 or involved as antagonists from whom the 
                                                        
62  See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
63  Appell, supra note 58, at 150–61. 
64  Id. at 154–56. 
65  Id. at 154. 
66  Id. at 156–60. 
67  Id. at 156. 
68  Id. at 160–61. 
69  Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 18–19. 
70  For instance, parents might support children’s right to vote and right to citizenship, 
among other quasi-civil rights obtained from the state. Children’s rights vis-à-vis the state 
can also benefit parents’ rights. See Jonathan Todres, Women’s Rights and Children’s 
Rights: A Partnership with Benefits for Both, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 603, 612–16 
(2004). 
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child is seeking to effectuate his rights to freedom from parental control.71 For 
instance, quasi-civil rights that provide liberty from parents are emancipation 
through the courts,72 the right to abortion,73 the right to marry,74 and the right of 
children to have their voices heard in custody disputes.75 Indeed, because pa-
rental consent may often vitiate the need to seek redress of civil rights from the 
state, parental opposition is not uncommon in these cases.76 A child may also 
seek the right to vote, to drink alcohol, to receive legal representation or juve-
nile treatment in criminal matters, to forego parental consent laws, or to access 
medical or genetic birth parentage information in a matter that is either uncon-
tested by or unknown to formal parents.77 These are usually rights exercised by 
older children who have the capacity and autonomy to pursue the liberty inter-
ests that support them. The CRC specifies a number of these quasi-civil rights, 
including the right to identity,78 the right to a nationality,79 the freedom of ex-
pression, and the right to receive information.80 
Quasi-civil rights may implicate dependency rights as well, particularly 
when such rights may provide freedom from parental control. However, despite 
the potential for overlap, they can still be distinguished because quasi-civil 
                                                        
71  See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (holding that a minor seeking an 
abortion must have consent from either a parent or the state, but that a parent cannot have a 
veto on a child’s right to an abortion without the potential for a state override); Moe v. 
Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding a law that required parental consent for mi-
nor to marry constitutional). 
72  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7120 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-150b 
(West 2009); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 371 (2014). See generally Carol Sanger & Eleanor 
Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH J.L. 
REFORM 239 (1992). 
73  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). 
74  See, e.g., Moe, 669 F.2d at 68 (minor seeking the right to marry without parental consent 
but the court upholding the constitutionality of parental consent to marriage laws). 
75  See CRC, supra note 4, art. 12 (identifying the right of children who are capable of identi-
fying their own views to express these views in matters affecting them, either directly or 
through a representative); Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1753. 
76  J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: Listening to Teens Who 
Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 
61, 173–74 (2003) (discussing the traumatic experience of minors who have to face parental 
opposition to their abortion in court); Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Note, Where Privacy 
Fails: Equal Protection and the Abortion Rights of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 604 
(1993) (discussing how parental opposition to abortion has contributed to late term abortions 
as some minors seek redress through the courts). 
77  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding that where a child faces a loss of liberty he or she 
must be afforded appropriate due process protections, including the right to counsel); 
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND 
MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 2–3 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing provisions that pre-
clude children’s rights including the right “to vote, hold public office, work in various occu-
pations, drive a car, buy liquor, or be sold certain kinds of reading material.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
78  CRC, supra note 4, art. 8.  
79  Id. 
80  Id. art. 13. 
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rights do not concern the need for care from others, although they could involve 
procedural rights in the process of determining care, such as having a voice in 
custody disputes.81 
Children also have the right to parental care and parents have a duty to 
provide this care.82 Parents have the corresponding right to privacy to raise 
their children free from state interference.83 Thus, cases such as Wisconsin v. 
Yoder84 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,85 which announce the doctrine of pa-
rental and family privacy, may also be used as examples of cases that promote 
children’s right to parental care.86 Parental privacy rights were not initially de-
veloped to oppose children’s rights, though this is how they are commonly po-
sitioned in modern times.87 Rather, they developed to oppose state interference 
with a child’s right to be raised by his or her parents without the state interfer-
ing or claiming rights over children.88 Children’s rights also concern protection 
from state intrusion.89 These privacy cases are part of the movement for chil-
dren’s rights because they allow a diversity of child upbringings.90 This line of 
thinking about children’s rights is also represented in the CRC. In Article 5, the 
CRC provides: “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and du-
ties of parents . . . to provide . . . appropriate direction and guidance in the ex-
ercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”91 Addi-
tionally, Article 7 continues by explaining that every child has “the right to 
know and be cared for by his or her parents.”92 In Article 14, the CRC states 
that “States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when 
applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of 
                                                        
81  See, e.g., Tari Eitzen, A Child’s Right to Independent Legal Representation in a Custody 
Dispute, 19 FAM. L.Q. 53, 60–65 (1985) (arguing that, in custody disputes, independent legal 
counsel for minors ensures that their interests are protected); see also Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of Children’s Rights: The Search for a Just and 
Workable Standard, 33 FAM. L.Q. 815, 827–30 (1999) (discussing the need to focus on chil-
dren’s voices in custody disputes based on a best interests analysis). 
82  See Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1818–27. 
83  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (noting that “[t]he liberty interest . . . of par-
ents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the funda-
mental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”). 
84  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing Amish children to avoid compulsory 
schooling requirements). 
85  Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (allowing children to be educated in a 
manner other than public schools). 
86  See Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 19. 
87  See discussion of relationship between parental rights and children’s interests infra Part 
II.B. 
88  See, e.g., WOODHOUSE, supra note 35, at 63 (discussing the rights of children to parental 
care having been brought to the United States as indentured servants); Stephen R. Arnott, 
Autonomy, Standing, and Children’s Rights, 33 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 807, 814–15 (2007). 
89  See Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 19. 
90  Cf. id. 
91  CRC, supra note 4, art. 5. 
92  Id. art. 7. 
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his or her right.”93 Thus, there is a broader understanding of children’s rights 
under both U.S. and international law that includes the notion that children 
have a right to be parented by their formal legal parents and that such parents 
should have freedom to act on their children’s behalf without governmental in-
terference. This set of rights is quite distinct from children’s quasi-civil rights 
because although they are intended to advance children’s interests, the interests 
are completely subrogated to legal parents who hold such rights on behalf of 
their children. Thus, it is the parents who struggle for such rights against the 
state, and children are the beneficiaries. 
Whether this category of children’s rights and interests legitimately reflects 
children’s interests at all is often contested and the case law is often used to cri-
tique parental privacy rights as in opposition to children’s rights.94 Importantly, 
children’s own voices may not be heard as parents are in a battle with the state. 
However, children’s rights can be upheld even when they do not have autono-
my or capacity to argue for themselves, and children’s own voices do not al-
ways need to be heard for their rights to be protected.95 In many instances it is 
best for parents in loving families to make decisions for their children, and pri-
vacy rights support such decisions.96 Indeed, Emily Buss makes a compelling 
case that parental privacy rights most effectively promote children’s best inter-
ests, arguing that too much state intrusion into a child’s upbringing, absent ex-
ceptional circumstances, will only complicate a child’s life.97 She argues that 
state intervention comes at a cost and should therefore be “limited to those cir-
cumstances where the costs of failing to intervene are great enough to justify 
the costs of intervention.” She makes this argument not only because parents 
are best able to judge the best interests of children, but also because states must 
rely on parental implementation of state-imposed directives pertaining to chil-
dren’s best interests.98 
 It is not my argument that family privacy is the only means of effectuating 
children’s rights; however, I do think it is an essential part of children’s inter-
ests. As Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues, “[children’s] growth to autonomy 
depends on the care and guidance provided by bonded care givers in the inti-
macy of the family, and children rely for their very survival on these supportive 
relationships.”99 Family privacy rights are not the enemy of children’s rights. 
Quite the opposite, in most cases they are the best proxy for advancing chil-
                                                        
93  Id. art. 14. 
94  See, e.g., Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 113, 138–44 (2009); Zug, supra note 12. 
95  See, e.g., Minow, supra note 44, at 1882–85. 
96  See, e.g., Buss, “Parental” Rights, supra note 23, at 647; Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 
316. 
97  Buss, “Parental” Rights, supra note 23, at 647–50. 
98  Id. at 649. 
99  Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 316. 
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dren’s interests.100 Parents are still the primary providers of childcare and their 
caregiving work is a central part of children’s interests. 
The third category of children’s rights is the right to adequate care.101 This 
right exists even if parents do not or cannot provide the necessary care. This 
right extends beyond parental privacy and can be subdivided into two types: 
rights to care that are effectuated by the state, and rights to care that are effec-
tuated by private parties other than parents. The state, through its parens patri-
ae power, is the legal guardian of children who do not have legal parents that 
are adequately providing for their needs.102 The right to such state-provided 
care is exercised in abuse and neglect proceedings, parental terminations, foster 
placements, and so forth.103 In the CRC, these kinds of rights run throughout, 
but are particularly highlighted in Article 19, which explicitly discusses the na-
tion-states’ responsibility to prevent the abuse and neglect of children,104 and in 
Article 20, which gives the child the right to government protection and alter-
native placement if taken from legal parents.105 In such cases, the government 
acts as protector of the child and is usually in conflict with legal parents, when 
acting to find suitable care in lieu of inadequate parental care. 
Children’s right to care may also refer to duties filled by caregivers other 
than formal parents. Quite a few commentators have promoted children’s right 
                                                        
100  Buss, “Parental” Rights, supra note 23, at 647–50. 
101  See generally Ex parte L.E.O., 61 So. 3d 1042, 1047 (Ala. 2010); Michael Wald, Chil-
dren’s Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 261–65 (1998); 
Woodhouse, supra note 3 (suggesting a new rights discourse that emphasizes children’s 
rights to have their basic needs met by adults as opposed to parental rights to raise children); 
Marla Gottlieb Zwas, Note, Kinship Foster Care: A Relatively Permanent Solution, 20 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 348 (1993) (discussing foster care children’s entitlement to a ser-
vice plan including adequate care and services). 
102  See Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First the Parent or the Child?, 
62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 322 (2010) (discussing the fact that “[i]t is well accepted that, pur-
suant to the doctrine of parens patriae, states are obligated to care for vulnerable children”); 
Daniel L. Hatcher, Purpose vs. Power: Parens Patriae and Agency Self-Interest, 42 N.M. L. 
REV. 159, 171–72 (2012) (highlighting the fact that “State agencies step in to protect [the] 
rights and interests [of children] when the parents can no longer appropriately care for their 
children”). 
103  See, e.g., In re Morgan, Nos. 9-04-02, 9-04-03, 2004 WL 1717934 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 
2, 2004) (terminating a mother’s parental rights to her twin sons, and granting permanent 
custody to the child agency); In re Pittman, No. 20894, 2002 WL 987852 (Ohio Ct. App. 
May 8, 2002) (terminating mother’s parental rights and granting custody to state agency); 
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, GROUNDS FOR INVOL- 
UNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 2 (Jan. 2013), available at 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf (outlin-
ing the common statutory grounds for determining parental unfitness and citing neglect as 
first on the list); Mary E. Taylor, Annotation, Parent’s Use of Drugs as Factor in Award of 
Custody of Children, Visitation Rights, or Termination of Parental Rights, 20 A.L.R. 5TH 
534, 537–39 (1994) (finding that a mother and father addicted to heroin were unfit to main-
tain their parental rights). 
104  CRC, supra note 4, art. 19. 
105  Id. art. 20. 
15 NEV. L.J. 236 - LAUFER-UKELES.DOCX 4/1/2015  4:06 PM 
Fall 2014] CAREGIVERS’ RIGHTS 255 
to care as delivered by third parties other than the state or parents, often called 
de facto or functional parents.106 Such functional caregivers may provide nec-
essary daily care in support, or in lieu, of formal legal parents when they are 
not able to fulfill their obligations.107 Such caregivers create significant rela-
tionships with children who may acquire a right to state protection of those re-
lationships. Accordingly, “functional parents” may be tagged with a duty of 
continued support as a consequence of care they provided in the past.108 The 
CRC can be understood to support the rights of functional parents, although it 
does not discuss them as explicitly as it does other kinds of rights. In Article 5, 
the Convention refers to respect for rights and responsibilities of parents or “the 
members of the extended family or community as provided by local custom” to 
provide direction and guidance to children in their exercise of rights.109 In addi-
tion, some argue that “functional parents” should be included under the term 
“parents.”110 In this category of rights the child and third-party caregivers seek 
protection of their relationship from the state, potentially, but not necessarily, 
over the objection of a legal parent.111 In other cases, a legal parent may con-
sent to such relationships but the state may not offer a framework to support 
them.112 
                                                        
106  See, e.g., Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a 
Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 85–96 (2004); Laura T. Kessler, Com-
munity Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 74 (2007); Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, 
supra note 13, at 439–41; Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Un-
derstanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 455 (2008). 
107  AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c) (2002) (defining “de facto parent”); Susan Frelich Apple-
ton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 20–21 (2008); Melanie B. Jacobs, 
Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recog-
nize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 314–32 (2007); Kavanagh, supra note 106, 
at 85 (“[T]he rule of the ‘exclusive’ family . . . is a central problem in family law in the 
United States . . . [It] is harmful to children, families, and the public interest [because it is] 
an intentionally, but unnecessarily, limited vision of parenthood that distorts the narrative of 
too many people’s lives.”); Murray, supra note 106, at 394; see, e.g., H. v. H., 676 N.Y.S.2d 
677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); In re Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028, 1029–30 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); 
Bupp v. Bupp, 718 A.2d 1278, 1281–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 
A.2d 959, 961 (R.I. 2000); Quinn v. Mouw-Quinn, 552 N.W.2d 843, 845 (S.D. 1996). 
108  See DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 123–67; Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-
Prigat, supra note 13, at 464, 467. 
109  CRC, supra note 4, art. 5. 
110  See Appleton, supra note 107, at 59; Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Legal Relationship 
Between Cohabitants and Their Partners’ Children, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 
150–51 (2012) (arguing that functional parents should be treated like “parents” for purposes 
of the necessity to give particular weight to parental prerogatives discussed in Troxel); Buss, 
“Parental” Rights, supra note 23, at 650–52. 
111  See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13, at 421–23. 
112  Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and 
Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 335 (discussing how functional parent-
ing arrangements, such as same-sex partnerships, are extremely vulnerable to negative cus-
tody determinations when the legal parent dies); see Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Chil-
dren(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CALIF. L. REV. 
15 NEV. L.J. 236 - LAUFER-UKELES.DOCX 4/1/2015  4:06 PM 
256 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:236 
Each category of rights described above has different primary parties and 
processes through which children can effectuate their rights. Thus, both the na-
ture of and the parties involved in these rights vary considerably, so different 
procedural methods for achieving different rights are appropriate. In the case of 
children’s “quasi-civil rights,” lawyers are best to advocate on behalf of chil-
dren.113 Lawyers are also best when children are treated as adults or have adult-
like proceedings against them—such as the termination of parental rights for 
teen parents114—and certainly when minors are involved in the criminal sys-
tem.115 On the other hand, when evaluating the best care situation for dependent 
children, whether during divorce, parental termination cases, or foster and 
adoption placements, it may be reasonable to rely upon guardians ad litem who 
work for the courts and can examine the child’s care situation in depth.116 At-
torneys representing children are often faced with dilemmas of whether to ad-
vocate based on children’s wishes or their beliefs regarding the child’s best in-
terests, particularly for children between the ages of six and fourteen.117 Thus, 
an attorney may be helpful, but should be used in addition to a guardian ad li-
tem, not instead of one, given the other pressures facing attorneys and their 
more limited training in social and child protection.118 When dealing with the 
care of older children who have a right to express their own interests and wish-
es, some methods for including children’s voices, like mediation119 or provid-
ing a guardian ad litem and an attorney, would be appropriate.120 Although all 
                                                                                                                                
1177, 1200 (2010) (examining equitable doctrines for functional parents and noting that not 
all states apply these equitable doctrines). 
113  See Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Law-
yers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1675 
(1996); Barbara Glesner Fines, Challenges of Representing Adolescent Parents in Child Wel-
fare Proceedings, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307, 314–17 (2011). 
114  Fines, supra note 113, at 314. 
115  See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 41 (1967) (giving children right to council in juve-
nile delinquency and criminal proceedings); Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a 
Child?: Allocating Responsibilities Among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency 
Cases, 6 NEV. L.J. 836 (2006). 
116  See Symposium, Session 3: Children’s Rights in the Context of Welfare, Dependency, 
and the Juvenile Court, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 267, 269–70 (2004) (discussing 
benefits of a CASA child advocate or guardian ad litem in representing children’s voices in 
dependency proceedings). 
117  Id. at 275. 
118  Id.; cf. Barbara Glesner Fines & Cathy Madsen, Caring Too Little, Caring Too Much: 
Competence and the Family Law Attorney, 75 UMKC L. REV. 965, 965–66 (2007) (arguing 
that all family law attorneys should be experienced in dealing with their clients’ psychologi-
cal demands). 
119  Merril Sobie, The Child Client: Representing Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 
22 TOURO L. REV. 745, 777–80 (2006); Melissa J. Schoffer, Note, Bringing Children to the 
Mediation Table: Defining a Child’s Best Interest in Divorce Mediation, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 
323, 323–24 (2005). 
120  Cf. Barbara Glesner Fines, Pressures Toward Mediocrity in Representation of Children, 
37 CAP. U. L. REV. 411, 445–47 (2008) (evaluating attorney and guardian ad litem percep-
tions of their respective roles in the system). 
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these methods are used to get at the child’s best interests and thereby pursue 
children’s rights, an initial identification of the kind of children’s rights to 
which we are referring may streamline the inquiry and reduce the need for a va-
riety of methods. 
In sum, “children’s rights” can be pursued in many different ways, have 
many different aspects and parties, and delineate conceptually diverse and not 
infrequently opposing goals. Although all these rights are valid and appropriate 
depending on the context, the mere use of the term “children’s rights” to define 
or prove anything can be confusing and amorphous due to these potentially 
conflicting meanings. Indeed, if we spend more time breaking down and con-
sidering the nature of the various rights at stake, we can do better in helping 
children effectuate those rights. 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH BEST INTERESTS: INDIVIDUALISM, CONFLICT, AND 
THE CLASH OF RIGHTS 
A. Best Interests and the Problem of Optimization 
While “children’s rights” can be divided and separated to delineate coher-
ent goals and conflicting parties, the term “best interests” is often used to cover 
advocacy for all such rights and various potentially conflicting interests.121 
Rights can guarantee a certain baseline of civil and care-based protections se-
cured by caregivers and the state. Regardless of the approach, whether through 
a capabilities approach to basic rights,122 an egalitarian approach,123 or a 
Rawlsian equilibrium view of rights,124 agreeing on the basic rights of children 
is by far a more manageable and modest challenge than deciding upon what is 
optimal for children. Children’s interests can be broad and include debatable 
goals regarding what is conducive to a child’s well-being and are easier to ar-
ticulate because there is no burden of optimization. 
In the context of custody decisions, best interests analyses are based on a 
variety of factors. Such factors often include, among others, the suitability and 
quality of the care being offered, the levels of conflict surrounding custody dis-
putes, the children’s wishes, and past caretaking arrangements.125 As part of 
                                                        
121  See McLaughlin, supra note 94, at 131. 
122  See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE 
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 5–6 (2000) (explaining the focus of the “capabilities approach”); 
Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6 J. HUM. DEV. 151 (2005). 
123  See generally T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998). 
124  See generally JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 
2001); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
125  See Richard A. Warshak, Parenting by the Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-Child Stand-
ard, Judicial Discretion, and the American Law Institute’s “Approximation Rule”, 41 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 83, 150 (2011) (discussing how, when making custody determinations, courts 
consider evidence regarding conflict between the parties each parties contribution to creating 
such conflict); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Primary Caretaker Role of Respective Parents 
as Factor in Awarding Custody of Child, 41 A.L.R. 4TH 1129 (1985) (discussing how several 
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this broad inquiry, religious126 and financial factors are often taken into ac-
count,127 as are marital and extended family situations,128 family violence,129 
and cultural and racial considerations.130 The inquiry is broad, flexible, and 
context specific. Children’s own stated preferences are usually considered, al-
though the weight given to such preferences varies by state and by the age of 
the child.131 The inquiry often entails competing and conflicting considerations 
between two fit parents. Still, the best interests standard is the dominant tool for 
determining custody in the United States,132 and the normative goal in interna-
tional conventions.133 
                                                                                                                                
courts have looked to who fulfilled the primary caretaker role in making custody arrange-
ments); D.W. O’Neill, Annotation, Child’s Wishes as Factor in Awarding Custody, 4 A.L.R. 
3D 1396 (1965) (discussing how the child’s wishes are also a factor in custody determina-
tions). 
126  See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Alaska 1979) (holding that religious fac-
tors are part of the best interests inquiry, and that holding otherwise would render a court 
blind to important elements bearing on the child’s best interest); see also Gary M. Miller, 
Note, Balancing the Welfare of Children with the Rights of Parents: Peterson v. Rogers and 
the Role of Religion in Custody Disputes, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1271, 1286 (1995) (considering 
how courts consider religion as a proper factor in the best interest test). 
127  See Carolyn J. Frantz, Note, Eliminating Consideration of Parental Wealth in Post-
Divorce Child Custody Disputes, 99 MICH. L. REV. 216, 217 (2000) (highlighting how many 
courts consider financial factors in custody hearings). 
128  See, e.g., David Carl Minneman, Annotation, Significant Connection Jurisdiction of 
Court to Modify Foreign Child Custody Decree Under §§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 
(PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(1), 67 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (1999) (listing 
cases considering the extended family of the child in making custody jurisdiction determina-
tions). 
129  See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence 
on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1070 (1991); Woodhouse, supra note 
81, at 826; see also Jerry von Talge, Victimization Dynamics: The Psycho-Social and Legal 
Implications of Family Violence Directed Toward Women and the Impact on Child Witness-
es, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 111, 157 (2000) (highlighting that “[c]hild custody and visitation 
decisions must be made with full knowledge of the previous family violence and potential 
for continued danger, whether or not the children have been physically harmed”). 
130  See Kathryn Beer, Note, An Unnecessary Gray Area: Why Courts Should Never Consid-
er Race in Child Custody Determinations, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 271, 273 (2011) (finding 
that state courts across the country have decided custody cases based on race, and arguing 
that state court’s should be precluded from considering race in child custody bases). 
131  See Barbara A. Atwood, The Child’s Voice in Custody Litigation: An Empirical Survey 
and Suggestions for Reform, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 640–41 (2003) (children’s wishes usually 
relevant but not dispositive); see also Tasker v. Tasker, 395 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986) (concluding trial court properly denied interview because court had discretion to 
make determination); O’Neill, supra note 125, at 1402–09. 
132  See Wallin v. Wallin, 187 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Minn. 1971) (reviewing the best-interest-of-
the-child concept as key to determining custody disputes); Dupré v. Dupré, 857 A.2d 242, 
248 (R.I. 2004) (highlighting that “[i]t long has been established that in awarding custody, 
placement, and visitation rights, the ‘foremost consideration’ is the best interests of the 
child”); D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Award of Custody of Child Where Contest is Between 
Child’s Mother and Grandparent, 29 A.L.R. 3D 366, 379, 384 (1970) (defining a child’s 
welfare as the primary consideration for courts, and how “courts have also implemented a 
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Much has been said in criticism of the ambiguity and discretionary nature 
of the best interests standard and the way it can negatively impact cases that 
depend on it.134 Here, I add to that criticism by making the case that in most in-
stances the use of the best interests standard is not helpful because it involves 
too many conflicting interests. Because the best interests standard mirrors and 
incorporates all the different children’s rights discussed above, such factors can 
easily conflict. Thus, the inquiry is often not only broad and ambiguous but in-
ternally inconsistent. 
In the face of conflicts and ambiguity, it is not surprising that state perspec-
tives and interests prevail. Children’s rights to care from parents and to care 
from the state are conflated into a singular judgment by the state about the “best 
care.” Ultimately, if children have a right to parental care, this means that par-
ents need to be given discretion to care for children in a diversity of ways. 
However, when the state is involved in judging care, its interests in children 
and the majoritarian values often expressed by the state can be in direct conflict 
with parental privacy.135 Using the term “best” to resolve this conflict is a futile 
strategy because it will depend on the opinions of judges and what is best is 
nearly impossible to prove. Moreover, as the examples below will demonstrate, 
leaving the state to determine what is best for children in an isolated manner 
will often result in an analysis that separates a child’s interests from a caregiv-
er’s interests in the difficult custody battles that the state must resolve. 
When courts attempt to locate children’s best interests it is no surprise that 
such an attempt is expensive and includes a variety of opinions from judges, 
guardians, parents, the children themselves, third-party caregivers, mediators, 
psychologists, and social welfare professionals.136 And even with all of this ex-
                                                                                                                                
wide range of other procedural rules in order to effect the result which will best serve the 
child’s interests”). 
133  See CRC, supra note 4 passim (“Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the 
primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of 
the child will be their basic concern.”); Merle H. Weiner, The Potential and Challenges of 
Transnational Litigation for Feminists Concerned About Domestic Violence Here and 
Abroad, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 756–57 (2003) (discussing how the 
“Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, . . . and Measures to Protect Children 
states that recognition of a foreign custody order may be refused ‘if such recognition is man-
ifestly contrary to the public policy of the requested State, taking into account the best inter-
ests of the child’ ”). 
134  See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in 
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 478 (1984); Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best 
Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 267, 267 (1987); Jon El-
ster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 
(1987); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Cus-
tody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1525 (1994); Mnookin, 
supra note 27, at 227. 
135  See infra Part II.B. 
136  See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in 
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 772 (1988) (discussing the need for 
experts); Kathryn L. Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making—How Judges 
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pensive input, it is perhaps impossibly difficult to “optimize” between suitable 
(non-harmful) caregivers or to accurately determine what is “best” for chil-
dren.137 Such expertise does not actually create the verifiability and certainty 
that it promises.138 As others have argued, such indeterminacy simply throws 
the decision back to judges, creating contested and expensive litigation or bar-
gaining in the context of uncertainty that usually favors the more powerful par-
ty.139 Best interests is a goal, not a standard that can provide clear answers.140 
Therefore, what is important is to assign clear responsibility so that the parties 
can work it out themselves in a reasonable manner.141 For a standard upon 
which so much of the advancement of children relies, all we really get is very 
little guidance, high costs, and uncertainty. 
In the next section, I will give some examples of how internal contradic-
tions in the meaning of best interests render the standard ineffective. I will 
demonstrate how using the best interests standard creates reliance on majoritar-
ian values, provides simplistic answers despite underlying complexity, overem-
phasizes the tension between caregiver and children’s interest, and uses state 
interests to inform what is best for children. 
B. Examples of Indeterminacy and Separation Between Care and Caregiver 
To demonstrate how the best interests standard and its individualistic focus 
on children’s rights does not do enough to support children and provide the 
care they need, I will give some practical examples that have divided scholars 
on the merits of best interests. In these examples, there is seeming conflict be-
tween caregivers and children, or state and parental rights, and in the face of 
such conflicts the best interests standard struggles to determine what is best for 
children. These are examples of the hard cases, the cases that fall between the 
                                                                                                                                
Use the Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 1, 10 (1998) (discussing how the courts in assessing the best interest of the 
child usually require an expert witness which increases the hardship for the parties); Veazey 
v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 390 (Alaska 1977) (recognizing that although a guardian ad litem 
increases the costs, a mediator or disinterested expert is often useful in custody cases). 
137  See Ariel Ayanna, From Children’s Interests to Parental Responsibility: Degendering 
Parenthood Through Custodial Obligation, 19 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2–3 (2012) (arguing 
against trying to optimize under a best interests standard due to the difficulties involved). 
138  Scott & Emery, supra note 7, at 73–74. 
139  See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 954–57 (1979) (discussing the effects of bar-
gaining in the context of uncertainty and, in particularly, effects on the weaker more risk-
averse party); Robert H. Mnookin & Eleanor Maccoby, Facing the Dilemmas of Child Cus-
tody, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 54, 71–72 (2002). 
140  Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 139, at 957; Katherine C. Sheehan, Note, Post-
Divorce Child Custody and Family Relocation, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 135, 138 (1986) 
(calling the best interest test “intrusive, unworkable, and indeterminate”). 
141  See Mnookin & Maccoby, supra note 139, at 72 (“Instead, the more basic criticism is 
that the best interests standard provides an uncertain backdrop for out-of-court negotia-
tions.”). 
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need for parental termination where caregiver relationships with children have 
completely broken down and instances where parental privacy is regularly ac-
cepted. It is in these kinds of cases that the need to protect children’s interests 
and rights is most pressing and sensitive to manipulation. These examples of 
the clash of rights generally and caregiver and children’s rights in particular 
demonstrate the futility of the individualized best interests standard. Best inter-
ests is at best inconclusive and is at worst biased in a manner that reinforces 
majoritarian cultural norms, allows state interests to override established care-
giving relationships, and imposes an idealized notion of care on the caregiving 
relationship upon which the child is already dependent. 
1. Deportation of U.S. Citizen Children with Alien Parents 
What should be done with the U.S. citizen children of illegal aliens who 
are being deported back to their countries of citizenship? Not infrequently, the 
state determines the fate of children who have already been removed from their 
parental homes because of insufficient living conditions and problematic cir-
cumstances usually intertwined with their parents’ illegal status.142 The recent 
trend is to determine the children’s fate—whether to remain with parents and 
be deported with them or to remain in the United States under state care—
based on a best interests analysis as opposed to a parental rights analysis in 
which children would only be removed from parental care upon a showing of 
unfitness.143 In her two articles on the subject,144 Marcia Zug advocates for the 
use of the best interests standard in situations where children have been re-
moved from parental custody prior to deportation.145 Others have argued 
against the use of the best interests standard and in favor of maintaining non-
U.S. citizens’ parental rights.146 Those in favor of a best interests determination 
argue that because children have the right to stay in the United States and their 
                                                        
142  Zug, supra note 12, at 1174–75. See generally Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deporta-
tion, Termination, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 63 (2012) (analyzing the growing practice of 
separating deported immigrants from their children). 
143  See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he termination of 
the father’s parental rights was based on the possibility that the father could someday be de-
ported and, with her mother’s parental rights also severed, [the child] might be returned to 
[state] custody or sent to Mexico.”); In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that termination of father’s parental rights by the juvenile court was premature 
where there was less than clear and convincing evidence that he was an unfit parent despite 
the fact that the lower court found that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate the fa-
ther’s rights); In re B. & J., 756 N.W.2d 234, 241 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (the juvenile court 
wrongfully terminated the parents’ rights based on a finding of “environmental neglect, con-
sisting of inadequate sleeping accommodations for the children in [the parents’] home”). 
144  Yablon-Zug, supra note 151; Zug, supra note 12;. 
145  Zug, supra note 12, at 1142. 
146  Stacy Byrd, Note, Learning From the Past: Why Termination of a Non-Citizen Parent’s 
Rights Should Not Be Based on the Child’s Best Interest, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 323, 327 
(2013). 
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parents do not, children and parental interests may not align; therefore, to pro-
tect children, the best interests standard is preferred over parental rights.147 
In such cases, the state and parents will often disagree as to what is best for 
the child. How can the state determine that it is in a child’s interests to stay in 
the United States and be raised by foster or adoptive parents rather than remain 
with their biological parents and be raised by them? Being raised by one’s own 
parents is a child’s right; so is receiving state-provided care when parental care 
is insufficient. Therefore, if fit parents are available, how can the state justify 
the termination of parental rights based on the child’s rights and best interests? 
On the other hand, if these children have already been removed from pa-
rental care due to suboptimal living conditions, one could argue that these cases 
no longer involve caregiver rights. However, these removals are not infrequent-
ly based on illegal status and poor living conditions, so this seems an unjust 
conclusion—punishing illegal residents with detachment from children.148 
Moreover, the time these children have been away from their parents may not 
have diminished the caregiving relationship previously established, depending 
on the circumstances. On the contrary, these children’s lives are in great tumult 
as they are living with foster families and their parents are in danger of being 
deported. Studies demonstrate that relationships between parents and children 
are not easily broken during short-term separations even when there has been 
abuse and neglect—and in such cases there has not been sufficient evidence to 
sever parental rights or prove abuse and neglect definitively.149 
Thus, the use of best interests instead of a parental rights doctrine mitigates 
the importance of these parental caregiving relationships. Indeed, allowing the 
best interests standard to determine custody instead of the usual abuse and ne-
glect standard allows a state’s interest in its citizen children to override chil-
                                                        
147  See James G. Dwyer, Parent’s Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine 
of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1373–79 (1994) (discussing the conflict between 
parental rights and children’s rights in the context of religious schooling); David J. Herring, 
Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: 
Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 
139, 141–43 (1992); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
637, 638–40 (2006) (“[T]he debate between advocates of parents’ rights and children’s 
rights is charged and polarized.”); Zug, supra note 12, at 1164–66. 
148  Zug, supra note 12, at 1174–75; cf. Naomi Cahn, Placing Children in Context: Parents, 
Foster Care, and Poverty, in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN: THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF 
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145, 145, 150 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen Worthing-
ton eds., 2009) (The author clarifies that, in reality, children are most often removed from 
their homes because of unstable parental income, and the author points to the strong correla-
tion between poverty and child abuse and neglect. For example, children who live in families 
that make less than $15,000 per year are forty-five times more likely to be abused or ne-
glected). 
149  See Marsha Garrison, Parents’ Rights vs. Children’s Interests: The Case of the Foster 
Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 381 (1996); Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing 
Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 129–34 (2013). 
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dren’s interest to be raised by parents.150 Zug does not specifically include the 
right to be raised by one’s parents as part of a child’s rights or best interests;151 
however, Zug and the state decisions upon which she relies, support the validity 
of parental privacy rights to some extent.152 To justify abrogating parental 
rights without a finding of abuse or neglect, one must rely on the state’s inter-
ests for removal. Zug argues that some state interests weigh in favor of keeping 
children in the United States, namely “the state’s interest in teaching children 
fundamental values of a democratic society” and “the state’s interest in keeping 
American children connected to America.”153 Therefore, the best interests anal-
ysis is used to make room for state interests and to limit children’s interests in 
being raised by parents. In conjunction with the state’s own interests, the state 
will also consider majoritarian values regarding what is best for children—
living in a wealthier economy and perhaps what is perceived to be a more sta-
ble household than that of deported aliens. Thus, the state minimizes children’s 
rights to be raised by their own parents in favor of state interests and majoritar-
ian values, and justifies this exchange in the name of best interests. 
In this way, citizen children’s rights to be cared for by parents are limited 
in favor of state interests in a manner that discriminates between children of il-
legal aliens and children of citizens.154 Just as one may argue that children of 
                                                        
150  Zug admits that a best interest standard does not automatically require termination from 
parents and in fact argues that in most cases it will not. In addition, she points to the fact that 
best interests analyses also involve parental considerations because, “[o]ne cannot consider 
the rights of children without also considering the rights of the people on whom they are de-
pendent, most often their parents.” Zug, supra note 12, at 1170. However, she continues to 
refer to the scenario where children remain with parents as one under the umbrella of “paren-
tal rights” which stands in opposition to children’s rights under a best interests standard. Id. 
at 1171 (“The strongest argument favoring parental rights is that parental rights do not just 
benefit parents, but they also benefit children. . . . As discussed above, the well-established 
criticisms of a parental rights standard cast significant doubt on these assumptions in gen-
eral.”). 
151  Id. at 1171. 
152  Id. at 1178 (“However, it is not obvious that children’s interests outweigh the equally 
substantial interests of fit parents in the care and custody of their children.”); Id. at 1182 
(“However, parental rights and children’s rights can and must coexist. As the long fight be-
tween children’s rights and parental rights advocates has shown, both standards have their 
place but neither one is right for all circumstances.”). 
153  Id. at 1147–51. 
154  Others who make a stronger child’s rights argument and are against any parents rights 
considerations in custody decisions, such as James G. Dwyer, argue that custody should al-
ways be made in the best interests of children without consideration of parental rights. In-
deed, for children born to at risk parents he has advocated that a children’s rights approach 
requires the removal of children from parents to adoptive or foster homes without the state 
having to prove abuse and neglect. See generally Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra 
note 12. In this manner, Dwyer’s position could justify ignoring parental claims of non-
citizens in the same way it does its citizens. But, of course, this strong state interference po-
sition in determining children’s best interests is nonetheless troubling for those who believe 
that parents generally have a right to raise their children as long as they have not been prov-
en unfit to do so or the belief that children have a right to be raised by these parents. See 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected 
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aliens are better off with a U.S. family, so could it be argued that the children 
of poor and unstable U.S. citizen families are better off with wealthier and 
more secure U.S. families.155 Children’s rights to be raised by their own parents 
should be applied consistently as between children of citizen and non-citizen 
parents. And, if imposing state interests and value judgments on children of cit-
izens is rejected it should be rejected for children of aliens as well. 
As I will argue in the next parts, instead of trying in this artificial manner 
to make sense of the interests of children and caregivers individualistically, the 
state should focus on supporting the caregiving relationships that support its 
citizens. If a citizen has an alien parent, despite the parent’s illegality, the rea-
son to let the parent stay in the United States is the furtherance of children’s in-
terests. It is clearly controversial to provide such a benefit to an illegal alien 
merely because they have given birth to a U.S. citizen; but, that is a conse-
quence of the naturalization process in the United States156 Once a child is a cit-
izen and if the state is truly interested in protecting the child’s rights, the state 
should not punish the children by deporting their parents. If, however, parents 
of U.S. citizens are to be deported, then the test should remain one of parental 
fitness, just as it is for U.S. citizens. State interests cannot justify abrogating 
caregiver rights in the name of children’s rights. 
2. Cultural Rights of Native American Children 
The Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) was intended to empower Native 
Americans to determine the identity and placement of children with Native 
American parents.157 Seeking to protect Native American civil rights and to 
maintain the cultural identity of Native American children, Congress enacted 
                                                                                                                                
Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over mi-
nor children.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The rights to conceive and to 
raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ ‘basic civil rights,’ . . . and ‘[r]ights far 
more precious . . . than property rights.’ ” (internal citations omitted)); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding parental right to raise children without undue governmen-
tal interference is fundamental liberty interest); see also Robert B. Keiter, Privacy, Children, 
and Their Parents: Reflections on and Beyond the Supreme Court’s Approach, 66 MINN. L. 
REV. 459, 490–98 (1982) (reviewing constitutional protections afforded to parents, children, 
and family privacy, and arguing “intrusion is only justified under extremely exigent circum-
stances”). 
155  Zug, supra note 12, at 1177. Zug describes domestic violence and potential death due to 
cultural realties in Guatemala—but if a child is so threatened, then refugee status for both 
child and mother may be appropriate. Moreover, the description of the entire country of Gua-
temala as dangerous to children seems problematic and perhaps exaggerated. Id. 
156  See Edith Z. Friedler, From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference: United States De-
portation of Its Own Children, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 494–95 (1995) (arguing 
against deportation of parents of children citizens in the name of children’s rights). 
157  Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902, 1915 (2012) (creating barri-
ers to removal of Native American Children from their parents and tribes, including the right 
of tribal intervention in removal proceedings and preference for placement with Native 
American families); 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2) (“Congress . . . has assumed the responsibility for 
the protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources . . . .”). 
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the ICWA to assure that children are raised within their Native American herit-
age. Thus, the ICWA recognizes the civil rights of Native Americans and the 
quasi-civil rights of Native American children to their own cultural and racial 
identities.158 This issue invokes the tension between children’s civil rights to 
identity and children’s right to receive care from the state. 
Many have noted, however, that the implementation of the ICWA has not 
met its promise to preserve cultural identity because it too often devolves into a 
“best interests” analysis that state courts have used to keep Native American 
children with non-tribal foster parents instead of transferring them to tribal au-
thorities.159 Critics argue that the goal of the ICWA to protect children’s civil 
rights has been essentially swallowed up by judicially created exceptions, such 
as the “existing Indian family” exception and “good cause” justifications not to 
transfer Indian child welfare cases to the tribe for resolution.160 According to 
these exceptions, if a Native American child is not removed from an existing 
Native American family or there is other good cause, the case remains in state 
courts for determination of what is best for children. State application of “best 
interests” prefers psychological ties to biological ties, and nuclear families to 
single-parent and extended families.161 Thus, a state’s enforcement of best in-
terests in custody undermines the civil rights that the ICWA was supposed to 
grant these tribes.162 Because dependency rights conflict with quasi-civil rights 
in these cases, and both types of rights are part of a broader best interests analy-
sis, the state’s understanding of the best upbringing for Native American chil-
dren gets wrapped up in the best interests label and usually defeats those quasi-
civil rights. Placing these two kinds of rights against each other in the best in-
                                                        
158  25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902, 1915. 
159  See, e.g., BARBARA ANN ATWOOD, CHILDREN, TRIBES, AND STATES: ADOPTION AND 
CUSTODY CONFLICTS OVER AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN 7–8 (2010); Appell, supra note 58, 
at 162–65; Cheyañna L. Jaffke, The “Existing Indian Family” Exception to the Indian Child 
Welfare Act: The States’ Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interests in Indian Children, 66 LA. L. 
REV. 733, 753 (2006); B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal Fo-
rum to Vindicate the Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State 
Courts, 73 N.D. L. REV. 395, 422–29 (1997); Kevin Noble Maillard, Parental Ratification: 
Legal Manifestations of Cultural Authenticity in Cross-Racial Adoption, 28 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 107, 124–39 (2003) (exploring how courts, using majoritarian, essentialist notions of 
“Indian-ness”, determine whether a parent is sufficiently Indian to make the child an “Indian 
child” for purposes of the ICWA); Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, One Step Forward, Two Gi-
ant Steps Back: How the “Existing Indian Family” Exception (Re)imposes Anglo American 
Legal Values on American Indian Tribes to the Detriment of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 329, 366–67 (2009); Alissa M. Wilson, Note, The Best Interests of Children 
in the Cultural Context of the Indian Child Welfare Act in In re S.S. and R.S., 28 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 839, 886 (1997); Kacy Wothe, Note, The Ambiguity of Culture as a Best Interests 
Factor: Finding Guidance in the Indian Child Welfare Act’s Qualified Expert Witness, 35 
HAMLINE. L. REV. 729, 758–75 (2012). 
160  Appell, supra note 58, at 162. 
161  Id. at 165. 
162  Id. 
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terests framework creates confusion and, in these cases, abrogates the civil 
rights of children. 
Despite the complex choices involved in determining whether children 
should grow up within their tribe or in third-party foster homes, the use of best 
interests creates the façade that courts are making rational, clear-minded judg-
ments about a child’s best interests.163 Thus, because courts have nothing but 
their own subjective judgments on which to base decisions when thinking about 
best interests, “decisionmakers often underestimate the value of the poor par-
ents of color, the child’s ties to them and his or her cultural heritage.”164 
In the ICWA cases, as in the case of aliens who are being deported, the 
state takes up the mantle of children’s rights, arguing that children have rights 
to normative majoritarian visions of the “best” or “ideal” care. However, chil-
dren’s rights are more complicated because identity and cultural issues are also 
at stake—not only for the parents or the tribe but for the children as well. In-
deed, it is problematic to identify children’s rights with majoritarian thinking 
about suitability when other factors also play into children’s rights, including 
parental privacy rights, quasi-civil rights, and cultural benefits in dependency 
rights, which may be in the interests of children as well. The dichotomy be-
tween parental rights to culture and children’s rights to care ignores what is the 
multi-factored and self-contradictory nature of the best interests standard itself. 
In deportation cases, parental privacy is overshadowed when determining 
best interests, and in ICWA cases, the children’s quasi civil-rights to their cul-
tural identities, as well as the benefits of being cared for in their biological cul-
ture, are undervalued. Yet again, best interests is used to hide a more complex 
determination by looking at children’s interests in isolation from their more 
complex needs. Although this example may seem tangential to the clash of 
caregivers’ rights and children’s rights examined in this article, as the tribe may 
not yet have had a chance to form such a relationship with the child, this exam-
ple clearly demonstrates the indeterminacy of best interests in the face of con-
flict between children’s civil rights and dependency rights. This is a primary 
example of difficult custody decisions regarding children, in which the best in-
terests standard is supposed to be applied.165 Moreover, when children have 
multiple potential claims to relationships—here to foster parents and relation-
ships with biological kin—all of these relationships would have to be taken into 
account under a relational perspective to properly give credence to caregiver 
rights.166 
                                                        
163  Id. 
164  Id. at 166. 
165  See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 542 N.W.2d 119, 121–23 (S.D. 1996) (considering whether the 
benefits of retaining cultural identity can be considered as part of custody dispute). 
166  See infra text accompanying notes 278–80 for a discussion of how biological and cultur-
al kin ties may also be a basis for forming an important and necessary caregiver relationship. 
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3. Rights of Children to Relationships with Birth Parents 
The third example I bring relates to the rights of children to have relation-
ships with biological parents even when parental privacy has been compro-
mised by abuse and neglect. Children’s rights advocates have pushed for early 
termination of biological parental rights culminating in the adoption of the 
Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”).167 Before or after the termination 
of parental rights, the question remains whether children should retain any legal 
or emotional relationship with biological parents who they had relationships 
with before being placed in the foster system.168 This issue emphasizes the ten-
sion between children’s right to relationships with biological parents as a mat-
ter of identity and past care, and their right to be provided adequate care by the 
state. 
Of course, if having contact with biological parents will continue to impose 
significant harm on children, such contact cannot be tolerated. However, there 
are instances, particularly for older children who feel attached to biological kin, 
where some contact, perhaps under supervision, may be more beneficial than 
harmful. Scholars have argued that even if children cannot live with their par-
ents and the state must step in to protect their rights by placing them in foster 
care, this is not the end of the inquiry into how to advocate on behalf of chil-
dren.169 From a child’s perspective, it is argued, the continuing bond with a bio-
logical parent, as long as it is not harmful, can be important for providing con-
tinuity, identity, and security.170 Despite the “bad” parenting that led to foster 
placement, children’s attachment to such caregiving parents is often strong.171 
Reviewing psychological studies, Marsha Garrison posits that a non-custodial 
parental figure that has provided significant amounts of care can also have a 
significant impact on a child’s life.172 Such insights have had some influence on 
the law. For instance, there is a preference for kin foster care over stranger fos-
ter care in many states, even if kin only know the child and do not have direct 
biological ties with him or her.173 These changes reflect complex notions of 
                                                        
167  ASFA amends Title IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act, which governs states’ 
federally funded child-protective efforts. Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A 
Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 
(2001). For representative discussions of ASFA, see generally Stephanie Jill Gendell, In 
Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First 3 Years of the Adoption and Safe Families 
Act Implementation, 39 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 25 (2001). 
168  See Annette R. Appell, Controlling for Kin: Ghosts in the Postmodern Family, 25 WIS. 
J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 73, 120 (2010). 
169  Garrison, supra note 149, at 377–90; Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 498–99 (“For chil-
dren, connection to others is a precondition to autonomy and individuality.”). 
170  Garrison, supra note 149, at 382–83; Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 498. 
171  Garrison, supra note 149, at 380–81. 
172  Id. at 383. 
173  Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 502–03; see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Making Poor 
Mothers Fungible: The Privatization of Foster Care, in CHILD CARE & INEQUALITY: 
RETHINKING CAREWORK FOR CHILDREN & YOUTH 83, 85 (Francesca M. Cancian et al. eds., 
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children’s needs and interests beyond the majoritarian visions of biological nu-
clear families.174 Children’s identity and attachment to parents and former 
caregivers, even in problematic contexts, may make kin care and some contact 
with parents beneficial. Thus, protecting children’s interests may require more 
than just foster care and adoption; children’s best interests may also require a 
continued connection with biological parents through open adoption arrange-
ments even after parental rights are terminated. Although majoritarian norms 
regarding what is best for children point to nuclear families that mirror intact 
biological families, such situations may not be appropriate for children of bro-
ken homes. 
Once again, best interests seems to collapse into a majoritarian view of the 
benefits of the nuclear family without sufficient consideration given to the 
complexity of family life, particularly with regard to children who are being 
removed from parental care. I cannot comment on what is “best” for children in 
the abstract or even with regard to any particular case, and this is not my goal; 
rather, my aim is to underscore that the determination of what is best is far 
more complicated than legislation and courts usually acknowledge. An interde-
pendency perspective on children’s rights could support an ongoing relation-
ship with biological birth parents in a manner different from that of formal le-
gal adoptive parents, depending on the potential for harm caused by the 
biological parents.175 
Indeed, as we saw in the deportation cases with regard to state interests in 
promoting democracy and connections with its citizen children, Garrison ex-
plores interests beyond those of children, such as those of the state, which 
might be persuading decision makers to emphasize adoption over kin foster 
care, and closed adoption over open adoption, as the “best” situations for chil-
dren despite research that indicates otherwise.176 She argues that the lower cost 
of adoption compared to subsidized foster care and the novelty and uncertainty 
of foster guardianship and open adoption make change slow. In addition, she 
recognizes that adoptive parents prefer closed adoptions and seek children to 
adopt that do not have ties to kin of biological parents.177 Thus, she says it is 
largely state and adoptive parental interests that influence policy and perhaps 
“creep” into best interests analyses that are supposed to focus only on children. 
                                                                                                                                
2002) (“Kinfolk and extended family have been recruited to serve as paid foster mothers, 
and by 1998 at least half of the states’ placements of children was with relatives.”); Sandra J. 
Altshuler, Child Well-Being in Kinship Foster Care: Similar to, or Different from, Non-
Related Foster Care?, 20 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 369, 369 (1998) (“The most strik-
ing increases have been in the number of children placed in kinship foster care.”). 
174  Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 503. 
175  See infra Part IV.A; see also Appell, supra note 168, at 74; Godsoe, supra note 158, at 
160. 
176  Garrison, supra note 149, at 386–387 (discussing cost and attractiveness to adopting par-
ents as reasons state may prefer adoption over foster care). 
177  Id. 
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4. Removing Babies at Birth from At-Risk Caregivers 
Although the right to reproduce and become a parent is only very rarely 
limited,178 James G. Dwyer and others179 have suggested that a best interests 
analysis can justify removing babies from high-risk parents at the time of 
birth.180 Dwyer argues that at birth children have the right to be placed with 
parents who will act in their best interests and that parents who have a history 
of abuse and neglect, are below eighteen years of age, imprisoned, have been 
convicted of a violent or sexual offense, have a mental illness or incapacity, or 
who already have multiple children on welfare, may not reach that standard. 
Therefore, their parenthood should be subject to judicial determination based 
on the welfare of the child and not determined by birth.181 In addition, Dwyer 
has argued that keeping babies with mothers who are jailed, as a number of 
states in the United States have allowed and others are considering,182 has been 
part of the prison system for more than a century, and that is even more com-
mon abroad,183 violates children’s constitutional rights and their best inter-
ests.184 These programs allow mothers to parent a child in prison for a prede-
                                                        
178  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Carey v. Popula-
tion Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or be-
get a child.” (emphasis omitted)); see, e.g., State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001) 
(allowing limit on reproductive freedom as terms of probation for deadbeat dad). 
179  See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: Effective 
Early Intervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1321, 1360 (2012). 
180  DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 254–56. 
181  Id. at 255–62. 
182  Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Nebraska, New York, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia 
and Wyoming allow such programs. James G. Dwyer, Jailing Black Babies, 2014 UTAH L. 
REV. 465, 470–71; Connecticut is currently considering such a program. See DIAMOND 
RESEARCH CONSULTING, PRISON NURSERY PROGRAMS: LITERATURE REVIEW AND  
FACT SHEET FOR CT (2012), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/JUDdata/Tmy 
/2013HB-06642-R000401-Sarah%20Diamond%20-%20Director,%20Diamond%20Research 
%20Consulting-TMY.pdf. 
183  Mother-child prison programs are much more common in Europe and Asia than in the 
United States Indeed very few countries are similar to the United States in routinely separat-
ing young children from mothers not detained in high security prisons. In prison programs 
worldwide it is not uncommon for children to attend daycare centers during the day. See, 
e.g., RAM SUBRAMANIAN & ALISON SHAMES, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING AND 
PRISON PRACTICES IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED 
STATES 16 (2013), available at http://www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/Resources/Resources 
/Handout/2014/2014-01-10_VERA-EuropeanCJPractices_2013-10.pdf; Michal Gilad & Tal 
Gat, U.S. v. My Mommy: Evaluation of Prison Nurseries as a Solution for Children of Incar-
cerated Women, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 394–96 (2013). 
184  The discussion of children’s constitutional “liberty” rights is beyond the scope of this 
article. Dwyer also argues that jailhouses nurseries are against a child’s best interests. See 
Dwyer, supra note 182, at 536–37. 
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termined amount of time, which may be subject to extension, under specified 
circumstances and almost always have maximum age limitations for the chil-
dren.185 Dwyer argues that living in a jailhouse setting cannot be best for chil-
dren regardless of age or emotional state in any circumstance.186 
There is no doubt that Dwyer’s arguments are compelling. Both incarcerat-
ing children and leaving them with at-risk parents appear to be deeply problem-
atic practices. Dwyer’s article on jailhouse nurseries is incredibly thorough and 
well-documented.187 Nonetheless, although I do not argue that all such jail-
house nursery programs should be continued under any circumstances, the 
blanket rejection of jailhouse nurseries seems not to account for the nuances of 
children’s interests and the ways in which such programs may be good for par-
ticular children. Studies document benefits for children and mothers.188 
Dwyer’s blanket assertions that all such programs should be prohibited and that 
the parental rights of all at-risk parents should be questioned can threaten chil-
dren’s relationships with caregivers. 
The readiness with which scholars are willing to sever the relationship be-
tween children and parents at birth may imply that the parental caregiving rela-
tionship begins at birth. However, gestation creates a significant connection be-
tween fetus and mother before birth.189 The physical, emotional, and functional 
care relationship based on interdependency, biological exchange, and physical 
nurturance is a real and lasting care relationship.190 Studies demonstrate that 
                                                        
185  All but one jailhouse nursery program limit participation to mothers whose expected re-
lease date is before the child will reach the maximum age of 18 months, and who have no 
history of violent crime or criminal child maltreatment; New York does not appear to have 
such limitations. See id. at 472. 
186  Id. at 535. 
187  I focus on Dwyer’s arguments in Jailing Black Babies, supra note 182, as representative 
of the kind of best interests arguments Dwyer makes, but will make references to his argu-
ments in his book, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 12, as well. 
188  For examples of studies that document the benefits of prison nurseries, see JULIE KOWITZ 
MARGOLIES & TAMAR KRAFT-STOLAR, CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., WOMEN IN PRISON PROJECT, 
WHEN “FREE” MEANS LOSING YOUR MOTHER: THE COLLISION OF CHILD WELFARE AND THE 
INCARCERATION OF WOMEN IN NEW YORK STATE 9 (2006) (children who are not able to 
maintain contact with incarcerated mothers are at greater risk of abusing drugs and/or alco-
hol later on in life. They are also at a greater risk for committing crimes and for underachiev-
ing in school); Lorie Smith Goshin & Mary Woods Byrne, Converging Streams of Oppor-
tunity for Prison Nursery Programs in the United States, 48 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 
271 (prison nurseries help keep children and mothers together and decrease the likelihood of 
children entering foster care). 
189  See ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 
64 (1976) (observing that in women’s experience, the fetus challenges the inside-outside du-
alism in western philosophy by being at once introduced from without and nascent from 
within, so that “[t]he child that I carry for nine months can be defined neither as me or as 
not-me.”); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal Inter-
ests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 588–90 (2011). 
190  Robert Martone, Scientists Discover Children‘s Cells Living in Mothers’ Brains,  
SCI. AM. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/scientists-discover-chil 
drens-cells-living-in-mothers-brain; Nancy Shute, Beyond Birth: A Child’s Cells May Help 
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gestating mothers often bond with their babies, creating deep attachments prior 
to birth.191 Therefore, there is already a caregiving relationship at birth and sep-
arating the mother from the newborn child is already separation of care and 
caregiver. Pointing to this pre-birth care relationship need not threaten the right 
to abort as personhood of the fetus can still begin at birth, viability, or whatever 
standard is preferred. Simply recognizing that gestation creates a care relation-
ship that is different from the genetic connection created by fatherhood does 
not pose a threat to feminism or women’s equality. Rather, such recognition 
supports women’s unique work and physical connection to fetuses.192 Many 
Americans would not want at-risk mothers to abort their babies, nor would 
many states permit them to after viability.193 Therefore, in essence, if their ba-
bies are removed from them at birth they are essentially made to be forced sur-
rogates for others. 
Dwyer complains that there are no studies to indicate that jailhouse nursery 
programs are in children’s interests and therefore such programs should never 
have been established.194 Although I agree that studies should be conducted, a 
dearth of studies cannot result in outlawing such programs. Admittedly, if such 
studies could definitively show harm to children, the programs would be hard 
to justify. But, as Dwyer admits, there are few studies to draw from and the ex-
isting ones were based on overly small samples and yielded inconclusive re-
sults.195 On the contrary, precluding such programs simply because studies are 
not yet available to show benefits makes innovation impossible. 
                                                                                                                                
or Harm the Mother Long After Delivery, SCI. AM. (Apr. 30, 2010), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fetal-cells-microchimerism (describing a process 
of cellular exchange between gestating mother and fetus known as microchimerism); see al-
so Catherine Arcabascio, Chimeras: Double the DNA-Double the Fun for Crime Scene In-
vestigators, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 435, 439 (2007) (citing 
J. Lee Nelson, Microchimerism: Incidental Byproduct of Pregnancy or Active Participant in 
Human Health?, 8 TRENDS IN MOLECULAR MED. 109, 109 (2002)). 
191  See Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (acknowledging 
“that a bond may well develop between a gestational mother and the infant she carried, be-
fore, during and immediately after the birth”); MARSHALL H. KLAUS & JOHN H. KENNELL, 
PARENT-INFANT BONDING 262–63 (2d ed. 1982); see also ROBIN FOX, REPRODUCTION AND 
SUCCESSION: STUDIES IN ANTHROPOLOGY, LAW, AND SOCIETY 71–79 (1993) (discussing the 
mother-child “bonding” that occurs during gestation); MARSHALL. H. KLAUS & JOHN. H. 
KENNELL, MATERNAL-INFANT BONDING 46 (1976); John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean 
to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 353, 397 (1991) (stating that prenatal bonding between mother and child “is supported 
by a great deal of evidence, both scientific and anecdotal”); R. Brian Oxman, Maternal-Fetal 
Relationships and Nongenetic Surrogates, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 387, 424 (1993). 
192  See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Approaching Surrogate Motherhood: Reconsidering Differ-
ence, 26 Vt. L. Rev. 407, 435–37. 
193  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973) (allowing states to prohibit abortion post-
viability unless the mother’s life or health is in danger); GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES 
IN BRIEF, AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS (Dec. 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf. 
194  Dwyer, supra note 182, at 480. 
195  Id. 
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As discussed at length above, a component of children’s rights is the right 
to parental care. Studies demonstrate that jailhouse nursery programs result in 
greater rates of parental care.196 Nurturing parental care certainly benefits chil-
dren, particularly if such care is supervised and in an educational setting, as is 
made possible by being in prison. The benefit of receiving such care and the 
benefits of continued mother-child care in a long-term nurturing relationship 
have been demonstrated to improve children’s well-being.197 Although Dwyer 
argues that the jailhouse programs are justified primarily based on benefits 
flowing to the mother, the potential caregiver, such as decreased recidivism for 
mothers who participate in the program as well as the benefit of being able to 
parent their babies even if in jail,198 studies demonstrate that there is a greater 
likelihood of future parental care based on these programs and the way in 
which such parental care is preferable for children, as compared to foster 
care.199 When compared to foster care options these children are hardly likely 
to be worse off.200 
In order to discredit prison nurseries, Dwyer compares outcomes for chil-
dren who are adopted, as opposed to in foster care.201 It is based on this com-
parison, he argues, that jailhouse nurseries cannot be justified in children’s best 
interests as children of adoption are significantly better off.202 But, this is not 
the current default system, as children removed from imprisoned mother are not 
freed immediately for adoption; rather they are sent to live with foster parents 
or kin. 
The immediate forced relinquishment of parental rights belonging to non-
violent low sentence offenders cannot be good policy. If mothers choose to re-
linquish their children, adoption may be the best option, but forced relinquish-
ment is a very different proposition. Many children are born to less than ideal 
parents, such as parents who pose a high risk of maltreatment, have mental and 
emotional limitations, struggle with prior or current drug addictions, live in un-
stable housing situations, are indigent, are illegal immigrants, are single par-
ents, and so forth. Indeed, Dwyer himself describes incarcerated mothers as a 
                                                        
196  See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 188, at 276–79. 
197  Sarah Abramowicz, A Family Law Perspective on Parental Incarceration, 50 FAM. CT. 
REV. 228, 234–35 (2012) (citing Mary W. Byrne, Key Findings, Maternal and  
Child Outcomes of a Prison Nursery Program, http://nursing.columbia.edu/byrne/pdf 
/KeyFindings07_09.pdf) (“The goal of such programs is to foster bonding and attachment 
between mothers and their infants, which studies have shown to promote healthier infant de-
velopment, in addition to reducing recidivism on the part of mothers—a factor that has led 
some to promote the programs as a cost-saving measure.” (footnote omitted)). 
198  Dwyer, supra note 182, at 480–81 (“The primary motivation for state actors to accede to 
advocates’ requests for more programs that bring children into prisons has been the law-and-
order and fiscal aims of preventing criminals from reoffending after they are released from 
prison.”). 
199  See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
200  See Dwyer, supra note 182, at 483 n.90. 
201  See id. at 480 n.78. 
202  See id. at 480. 
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population with high rates of women with mental problems, drug addictions, 
ties to criminal activity, histories of sexual abuse, and undeveloped or weak at-
tachments to their own parents. Moreover many of these women were raised in 
foster care, have family members who have been incarcerated, are victims of 
domestic violence, and have limited education and work experience.203 Indeed, 
there is overlap between the conditions that Dwyer says make prison inmates 
at-risk parents and those Dwyer argues make parents high-risk and subject to 
potential termination in children’s best interests even when not in prison.204 
This threat to the range of American families and their right to raise their chil-
dren is broad and would alter the way we view parenthood and child-raising, by 
giving the government the right to transfer children from poorer, more at-risk 
parents to wealthier, majoritarian families. Although proven abuse and neglect 
may justify terminating parental rights, questioning parental rights because of 
the fear of potential maltreatment based on predetermined risk factors gives 
enormous discretion and power to the state. 
In lieu of outlawing all such programs as Dwyer suggests, and forcing 
adoption to more “optimal” families, more can be done to improve conditions 
for these children and their caregivers in the jailhouse setting. For instance, the 
stressful and unhealthy environment that Dwyer describes in jailhouse nurseries 
might be alleviated by addressing the conditions of such nurseries or providing 
that children spend time in outside daycare centers. The conditions of jailhouse 
nurseries that Dwyer describes are subject to oversight and perhaps can be 
made less stressful than conditions for some children in their legal homes or in 
foster care settings. State involvement can be used to improve conditions as 
opposed to severing ties with parents because they are in jail for a short period 
of time and do not have relatives who can provide adequate care. Because these 
mothers are in custody, it is an opportunity to educate and improve their parent-
ing skills as they are literally a captive audience who has nothing but time for 
such education, as opposed to other family settings where states are not in-
volved or only involved in crisis management. The costs to the state are not 
likely to be more in the long run, given the costs of foster care for children and 
jailing repeat offenders, as jailhouse nursery programs may reduce recidivism 
rates.205 In Europe, such efforts have apparently been successful overall, are 
popular, and regularly considered in line with children’s best interests.206 Al-
                                                        
203  See id. at 493–94 (describing challenges of inmates upon reentry and inmates’ character-
istics). 
204  DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 260 (discussing similar at-risk charac-
teristics relevant to pregnant inmates as compared to those Dwyer would consider “high-risk 
parents” and thus subject to judicial oversight in maintaining parenthood rights). 
205  See, e.g., Erin Jordan, Prison Nurseries Cut Female Inmates’ Risk of Reof- 
fending, GAZETTE (Mar. 31, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://thegazette.com/2011/01/31 
/prison-nurseries-cut-female-inmates-risk-of-reoffending (describing the creation of prison 
nursery programs in Nebraska, California, Indiana, and Illinois and discussing how jailhouse 
nursery programs will save the state money). 
206  See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
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though the jailhouse may never be an “ideal” setting for child care, it is not 
likely to be abusive or neglectful either, and more can be done by the state to 
improve conditions, which would reduce stress, violence, and hostility. Al-
though this less stressful, healthier environment, which includes possible out-
sourcing to ordinary civilian daycare centers, may not be the reality in some or 
many of these programs, neither is the forced adoption system that Dwyer sets 
up as the alternative to jailhouse nurseries. 
Moreover, a few specific inquiries need to be considered in assessing the 
appropriateness of jailhouse nursery programs under particular circumstances. 
First, the benefits of breastfeeding are considerable and doctors often recom-
mend nursing for at least one year.207 The benefits of having a nursing mother 
are not specifically considered in Dwyer’s article and because we are consider-
ing the care of very young babies, such consideration seems appropriate. Sec-
ond, it is necessary to consider the mother’s sentence. If the mother can leave 
the jail along with the baby at the end of her term and before the baby is too 
old, the possibility of a continuing relationship with an ongoing caregiver must 
be weighted more heavily against the unideal setting of the jailhouse. However, 
if the baby must ultimately be separated from the caregiver when the child is 
older and more aware, these negative effects would weigh against jailhouse 
nursery programs.208 Third, once a child is older than eighteen months, the 
problem of living in the jailhouse is more concrete and certain limitations seem 
prudent—although some programs allow children to stay for up to two or three 
years. However, there is still the question of whether the child could be raised 
by the mother’s kin or brought to daycare centers in order to keep the family 
together when the mother is released, so long as the mother’s release does not 
occur too long after the child reaches eighteen months. This depends on availa-
bility of kin caregivers, the term of the mother’s sentence, and other factors that 
are relevant in considering whether a program that keeps mothers and babies 
together in a jailhouse setting may be beneficial. 
Being raised in a networked “kin” family may not meet ideal notions of the 
nuclear family, but it is not for the state to judge such care networks if they are 
not abusive or neglectful. Best interests is more complex than Dwyer’s article 
relates, and the three questions above need to be asked and weighed when de-
termining a women’s suitability for a jailhouse nursery program rather than 
outlawing these programs altogether. Ongoing caregiver relationships and chil-
dren’s cultural identity are also important to their well-being.  
                                                        
207  See OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUR 
GUIDE TO BREASTFEEDING 15 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.womenshealth.gov 
/publications/our-publications/breastfeeding-guide/BreastfeedingGuide-General-English.pdf; 
Cindy Harmon-Jones, Duration, Intensity, and Exclusivity of Breastfeeding: Recent Re-
search Confirms the Importance of These Variables, LA LECHE LEAGUE INT’L (Oct. 14, 
2007), http://www.lalecheleague.org/ba/may06.html. 
208  Dwyer, supra note 182, at 492–93. 
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There is also a clear racial and socioeconomic impact to Dwyer’s argu-
ments. As Dwyer himself forcefully emphasizes, the issue of jailhouse nurse-
ries largely, but not exclusively, concerns minority babies who are living in 
jails or who are born to high-risk parents who are under tighter state surveil-
lance. There is something innocent and compelling about wanting to protect 
children by relying on foster care and adoption, rather than high-risk mothers 
and their families, to care for children. However, it also demonstrates how 
powerful the best interests standard can be when wielded by the state. The state 
should not be the arbiter of the composition of the perfect family; nor should it 
be the predictor of who will be good parents. Caregiving mothers, from preg-
nancy onward, should be supported to provide needed care for their children. 
Children should not be forcefully separated from mothers and then raised in a 
costly and overburdened foster system while waiting to be adopted. First and 
foremost, caregivers should be supported by programs that seek to make good 
parents of those who may not have had a good upbringing and to break the cy-
cle of abuse and neglect. If abuse or neglect nonetheless results, or preliminary 
direct evidence can be demonstrated, and is based on more than just indirect 
statistical evidence that creates a credible threat of abuse, then the state is left 
with no choice but to step in to protect the child. 
Best interests should not be used to make sweeping judgments about chil-
dren of at-risk parents and jailhouse nurseries. Raising children is complicated, 
which is why best interests is such a complicated and ambiguous standard, and 
why it should not be used to hold caregivers to idealized majoritarian models of 
parenting and care by trying to optimize and disqualify at-risk caregivers. 
Caregiving attachments must be encouraged, promoted, and supported unless 
the state discovers abuse and neglect, and then alternate caregivers should be 
found and supported. 
These examples are intended to (1) demonstrate the way conflicts between 
different categories of children’s interests create tension and ambiguity in de-
termining what is “best” for children; (2) critique state reliance on its own in-
terests and simplistic majoritarian values as a means of avoiding the adequate 
consideration of the complex and conflicting interests involved in best interests 
analyses, and demonstrate that what usually get minimized are caregiving rela-
tionships that do not follow majoritarian idealized norms of the nuclear family; 
and (3) demonstrate how caregiver interests are regularly separated from chil-
dren’s interests, which are adjudicated in an individualized manner that focuses 
on the child’s rights and interests independent of ongoing relationships. 
This criticism is intended to stem the tide of the use of best interests as the 
primary means of promoting children’s interests. In the remainder of the article 
I will move beyond analysis and criticism of the best interest standard for ad-
vocating on behalf of children and protected children’s rights and begin the 
complex work of providing alternative legal standards for protected children’s 
rights in the context of custody disputes. 
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III.  INTEGRATING CAREGIVER RIGHTS WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
Determining what is “best” for children is a complex endeavor that cannot 
be solved simply by giving power to the state or parents to decide what is best 
and calling it “best interests.” Determining what is best is not feasible because 
adjudicating children’s rights and interests involves conflicting components 
making such an inquiry endlessly complex and subject to bias and manipulation 
depending on who has the power to decide. In this part, I refocus the debate in 
order to make it more substantive and less binary and antagonistic. As opposed 
to isolating children’s interests in a vacuum, I argue that children’s interests 
must be examined within the context of the caregiving relationships that sup-
port them as an appropriate reflection of their dependency. Although quasi-civil 
rights are also relevant for children, what children mostly need are dependency 
rights fulfilled by relationships that support them; therefore, such relationships 
should be at the center of any inquiry into children’s rights and interests.209 By 
focusing on caregivers’ rights and children’s rights while the caregiver relation-
ships are still ongoing, family law can do more to support these essential rela-
tionships. 
First I will clarify the nature of caregiver rights, and then I will discuss 
how to account for caregiver and children’s rights in tandem. Finally, in Part 
IV, I will apply this framework in the custodial context. 
A. Caregiver Rights and Interests 
The previous sections have discussed at length the nature of children’s 
rights and interests, and have pointed to the reality that most of children’s inter-
ests involve dependency rights—the need for care and nurturing from parents, 
caregivers, and the state. I have also demonstrated how the law regularly sepa-
rates caregiver interests from children’s interests in a variety of contexts and 
relies on the best interests standard to make impossible judgments about what is 
best for children. Thus, the law regularly sets up a tension between children’s 
rights and caregiver rights. 
However, as Woodhouse notes, as a matter of logic and sheer practicality, 
it is increasingly evident that children’s rights cannot be promoted without ad-
vancing caregiver rights: “Policymakers increasingly recognize that a society 
cannot care for its children without addressing the needs of their caregivers, 
who must either be subsidized at home or given the support they need to partic-
ipate in the labor market as breadwinners.”210 Caregivers’ choices, needs, inter-
                                                        
209  See NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 19. 
210  Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 512; accord EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS 
ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 28 (1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Future of 
Feminist Liberalism, in THE SUBJECT OF CARE: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON DEPENDENCY 186, 
188 (Eva Feder Kittay & Ellen K. Feder eds., 2002) (while individualistic liberalism relies 
on the “fiction of competent adulthood . . . [r]eal people begin their lives . . . in a state of ex-
treme, asymmetrical dependency, both physical and mental, for anywhere from ten to twenty 
15 NEV. L.J. 236 - LAUFER-UKELES.DOCX 4/1/2015  4:06 PM 
Fall 2014] CAREGIVERS’ RIGHTS 277 
ests, and rights affect and are indelibly intertwined with those of their children, 
due to the constant care parents must provide. Thus, separating children’s rights 
from caregiver rights, and punishing or benefiting one without the other, is in-
feasible because the other will always be affected. A caregiver’s every choice 
will affect her child, particularly a young, dependent child, and any punishment 
inflicted upon a caregiver will also affect that child. That which advances or 
hinders the interests of a caregiving parent will necessarily affect the interests 
of that parent’s child, and vice versa. Attempts to isolate child and caregiver are 
not reflective of the interdependent nature of care.211 Such interdependency 
compromises the individuality of the caregiver,212 and minimizes the independ-
ent needs of the child. However, interdependency is the reality, and recognizing 
it is more important when supporting children’s rights than are symbolic ges-
tures protecting the individual liberties of caregivers and children.213 
If the needs of caregivers and children are indelibly intertwined, then sup-
porting children means supporting caregivers as well. Children cannot be as-
sured care in isolation. Thus, care must be given by someone who has adequate 
financial, emotional, and psychological means to do so.214 It is not enough to 
pit parental rights against children’s rights and punish parents who do a less-
than-optimal job—those who are not the “best.” Why would we want to set 
these parents up for failure? There are not enough parents to go around for all 
the children in need. The foster care system is expensive and overwhelmed.215 
                                                                                                                                
years”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Au-
tonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 16–23 (2000); John 
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 779, 788 (1997); 
Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 830–31. 
211  Sources cited supra note 190. 
212  See FINEMAN, supra note 18, at 14; SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE 
FAMILY 139 (1989); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equali-
ty in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1–2 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, 
The Vulnerable Subject]. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY 
MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004) (discussing how autonomy is impossible for inter-
dependent caregivers and for children in need of care). 
213  ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL 
EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 94–95 (2003) (“[W]hen we are acting as caregiv-
ers, we need not rights that falsely presuppose our autonomy and independence, but rights 
that frankly acknowledge our relational reality: when infants, children, or aging parents are 
dependent upon us, we are dependent upon others for support and sustenance.”). 
214  See, e.g., Mary Lyndon Shanley, The State of Marriage and the State in Marriage: What 
Must Be Done, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 188, 200 (Anita 
Bernstein ed., 2006) (“The kinds of measures that would foster autonomy for adults and ena-
ble them to provide for children in their care include health insurance, affordable and quality 
child care, child allowances of the kind common in Europe, flexible workplace hours, and 
paid parental leave for both men and women.”). 
215  See Patricia Chamberlain et al., Enhanced Services and Stipends for Foster Parents: Ef-
fects on Retention Rates and Outcomes for Children, 71 CHILD WELFARE 387, 387 (1992) 
(“Current national trends show that although the number of available foster homes is shrink-
ing, the number of children and adolescents being cared for in the family foster care system 
is growing.”); Nolan Rindfleisch et al., Why Foster Parents Continue and Cease to Foster, 
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Accordingly, parents who are trying to provide good care need financial and 
legal support for their efforts. Society should focus on providing the necessary 
support so that caregivers may provide good care. 
Progress has been made in supporting dependents and caregivers as a unit 
with such developments as the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which 
allows a limited amount of unpaid leave to caregivers who want to care for 
children or other dependent family members.216 However, such progress is 
quite limited and much more needs to be done.217 The United States has lagged 
behind other countries in recognizing rights that extend beyond the individual, 
relying solely on privacy and individuality to cover children’s needs. As 
Woodhouse suggests, “Americans must face the fact that these concepts [of 
community and caregiver rights] are considered foundational in most of our 
peer nations.”218 The American focus on individual rights in family law and 
beyond impedes our ability to provide for dependents and ensure the care that 
is so based on interdependency.219 In short, an individualistic perspective im-
pedes promoting children’s interests. 
For instance, some feminists argue that women need to be incentivized to 
establish themselves in the marketplace and therefore long maternal leave poli-
cies become problematic.220 However, child development studies clearly 
demonstrate that one-on-one contact during the first year of life is best for chil-
dren’s development.221 Thus, from a purely children’s rights perspective, it is 
clear that caregivers need time off from work to provide that care, and that the 
three months unpaid leave provided by FMLA is not enough. Moreover, it is 
only to promote a parent’s interest that leave is limited to protect women’s 
standing in the workplace.222 Although it might not make sense for a woman to 
                                                                                                                                
25 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 5, 6 (1998) (citing documentation by Kamerman and Kahn, as 
well as General Accounting Office reports); Susan Rodger et al., Who Is Caring for Our 
Most Vulnerable Children? The Motivation to Foster in Child Welfare, 30 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 1129, 1130 (2006) (“[T]here is concern that the foster care system may not be 
growing at a pace that can provide the necessary capacity to meet this [growing] need.”). 
216  Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012). 
217  See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the 
Ladder, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY. L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2012); Marianne DelPo Kulow, Legislat-
ing a Family-Friendly Workplace: Should It Be Done in the United States?, 7 NW. J.L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 88, 93 (2012); Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The 
Explosion of State Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 669, 697 (2008). 
218  Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 850. 
219  Id. 
220  Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 2, 41, 46–50 
(2005). 
221  Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 830–31. 
222  See Lester, supra note 220, at 2 (arguing for paid family leave but arguing against gener-
ous, long leave because of its effects on women’s status in the workplace). 
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leave her place of employment for a year, it might be best for children.223 From 
family leave to economics, education, and health, children’s rights require 
providing support for caregiver rights and interests—even if supporting care-
givers does not support women’s place in the job market.224 
Accordingly, our failure to value care properly and to focus on individual-
istic rights leads too often to both a conceptual and actual separation of child 
and caregiver.225 As Martha Minow concludes, “we need to develop a perspec-
tive on children’s rights that refrains from comparing the abilities of children 
and adults and instead addresses their mutual needs and connections.”226 We 
must move from oppositional accounts of children’s and parental rights and in-
terests—or children’s and state interests—when it comes to dependency rights 
and move to a mutually supportive framework that affirmatively supports care-
givers and the children for whom they care in a mutually beneficial manner. 
Primary caregivers are those parents who do most of the day-to-day care, 
such as preparing children for school in the morning and picking children up 
after school, arranging for afterschool activities and enrichment, taking children 
to doctor’s appointments, and otherwise supervising health and educational 
needs.227 Primary caregivers often stay home with children temporarily or even 
long term during their “tender years” and often curtail employment opportuni-
ties to engage in caregiving work and provide for children’s everyday needs.228 
                                                        
223  This example also distinguishes between woman’s interests and caregiver interests. 
Caregiver interests refer to interests associated with those who are caring for children while 
woman’s rights may not be associated with such care. 
224  Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 830–31. 
225  Id. at 832–33 (“Our failure to see the child in the ecological context also leads to the 
conceptual (and, too often, the actual) separation of the child from her caregivers. A child-
centered jurisprudence cannot be truly child-centered if it excludes the concerns of caregiv-
ers. In ignoring the needs of caregivers, primarily women, we ignore the needs of the chil-
dren.” (footnote omitted)). 
226  Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 2. 
227  See David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 916–18 (W. Va. 1989); Garska v. McCoy, 
278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W. Va. 1981); Richard Neely, Commentary, The Primary Caretaker 
Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 168, 180 
(1984). 
228  See Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 37; Joan Williams, Response 
Essay, “It’s Snowing Down South”: How to Help Mothers and Avoid Recycling the Same-
ness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812, 828 (2002) (“Today, two out of three 
mothers are employed less than forty hours a week during the key years of career advance-
ment—and eighty-five percent of women become mothers.”); see also CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 37 (1987) (“Most jobs 
in fact require that the person, gender neutral, who is qualified for them will be someone 
who is not the primary caretaker of a preschool child.”); DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. 
BIANCHI, BALANCING ACT: MOTHERHOOD, MARRIAGE, AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN 
WOMEN 147 (1996) (indicating that only 28 percent of women with young children work 
full-time outside of the home, while an additional 40 percent work from home and/or part-
time); Mary E. O’Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 501–03 (1988) (noting that the “Human Capital” theory of alimony 
focuses on what caretakers have sacrificed by leaving the work force or moving to part-time 
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Although it is not always the case, primary caregivers are usually identifiable 
even when both parents are pitching in to some extent.229 The easiest way to 
identify a primary caregiver is to identify the parent whose work hours are 
shorter and who balances care with work on a daily basis.230 
Regardless of which parent is the primary caregiver, or whether a parent 
can be identified as a primary caregiver at all, most parents are caregivers to 
some extent. Primary earners also support and care for children. Third parties 
may also be caregivers and may provide more care and support than formal 
parents.231 The more care a parent or other caregiver provides, the harder it is to 
separate the caregiver from the child when it comes to rights and interests. 
However, all caregivers have interests that are intertwined with the rights and 
interests of their children reflecting the care they provide. 
A caregiver’s rights and interests become intertwined with the child’s life 
because of the direct effect of their life choices on the child as well as the con-
straints that raising children places upon them. Almost anything they do has 
some effect on their children, particularly when the children are young and 
when they are most dependent. If a primary caregiver is overwhelmed and does 
not have necessary support—whether financial or emotional—and therefore 
wants to relocate, the interests of the child are interconnected with those of the 
caregiver because a caregiver cannot provide good care without feeling stable 
and secure herself.232 Caregivers, particularly primary caregivers, often inhibit 
their own market work to provide necessary care. As a result, their religious, 
geographical, and personal needs, as well as their physical safety, are never 
completely separable from their child’s needs and interests. 
Critics of such a perspective argue that there is significant danger in seeing 
caregiver well-being as intertwined with children’s well-being, as the latter will 
suffer when there is focus on the former.233 Children’s needs will be skimmed 
over for the sake of parents’ interests, and the focus will be on parental rights 
rather than children’s interests. Lawyers and judges, it is argued, would be bet-
ter off focusing on children than on mixing parental well-being into the in-
quiry.234 But, this perspective misses the fundamental nature of children’s 
needs: to be cared for by parents or other caregivers who will provide sup-
port.235 A caregiver’s well-being directly affects and influences his ability to 
                                                                                                                                
schedules and misses the feminine choice to engage in certain jobs or professions that have 
flexible hours but are not as highly compensated); Donald R. Williams, Women’s Part-Time 
Employment: A Gross Flows Analysis, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1995, at 36, 36 (most mar-
ried mothers still work primarily part-time). 
229  See Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 2–3; see also WILLIAMS, su-
pra note 18, at 2. 
230  See Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 2. 
231  See infra Part IV. 
232  See Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 3. 
233  Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra note 12, at 128–29. 
234  Id. 
235  See supra Parts I.B., III.A. 
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provide adequate care, and the benefits of that care, to children. Attempting to 
separate these inquiries misses the very nature of care itself. There is no good 
way to isolate children from caregiving parents except where the relationship 
itself causes enough harm to justify the state interference, and where the inter-
ference would actually prevent more harm than it would cause. 
Therefore, I argue that creating a system of law and state support that fo-
cuses on children’s rights separate and apart from caregivers’ rights is illogical 
and bad policy, unless we are in the narrow area of enforcing children’s quasi-
civil rights against the wishes of parents or when there is abuse and neglect. 
And, even when dealing with quasi-civil rights, the nature of the ongoing rela-
tionship must be taken into account. In most circumstances and as a matter of 
forward-looking state policy, these rights should be viewed as overlapping and 
co-supportive, and not as potentially conflicting. 
B. Vulnerability Analysis and Relational Rights: Reconceiving Children’s 
Rights 
In this part, I offer two theoretical frameworks for resolving the potential 
tension between caregivers’ rights and children’s rights. As the caregiver and 
child are different persons, and rights attach to the individual in the liberal U.S. 
tradition, a framework for thinking of these rights in tandem is helpful. First, I 
discuss Martha Fineman’s vulnerability framework and then Jennifer 
Nedelsky’s perspective on relational rights. Both of these frameworks provide 
clear conceptual guidelines for considering how rights can work together as 
opposed to in conflict with one another. 
1. Vulnerability Analysis: The Vulnerability Inherent in Relationships 
In the liberal, individualist tradition that underlies much of modern U.S. 
law, rights talk divides and separates rights holders into individual stakeholders 
that compete with one another. Here, we are discussing the right to protection 
of children, who, as dependents, were once treated as property of parents, and 
are in need of care. Separately, we are also discussing the rights of caregivers 
who sacrifice market work and personal pleasures to care for these children. 
Feminists have fought to secure basic rights for caregivers and value for 
the work they do for their children and for society.236 The focus of this article is 
the clash of these potential rights. In trying to decipher the relationship between 
two competing sets of rights it is helpful to keep in mind that these rights are 
exercised against the state and are often exercised to protect each individual’s 
vulnerability. However, the quest for state protection of such vulnerability need 
not create conflict and tension between stakeholders; rather, the quest univer-
                                                        
236  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 25. 
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salizes the struggles we face in pursuit of justice.237 Martha Fineman argues 
that just as individualism and the separation of rights among persons is a uni-
versal theory, so should it be a universal theory that liberal individualism does 
not provide sufficient support to vulnerable parties.238 Both children and care-
givers have been underprivileged and underrepresented groups and it seems un-
fortunate to have to pit their rights against each other and choose.239 As Fine-
man suggests, we should move away from differentiation and focus instead on 
“the relationship and complementary shared responsibilities of the individual, 
the state, and societal institutions in regard to responding to the realities of the 
human condition.”240 
From this perspective, children and caregivers share the vulnerability of the 
human condition. Because children depend on caregivers who in turn are deep-
ly intertwined with their children in facilitating their well-being, it makes sense 
to protect these vulnerabilities in a complementary, shared fashion that is fo-
cused on relationships. These relationships should not be viewed as deviant but 
as the focus of state support.241 Unlike rights talk that pits the rights of one side 
against the rights of the other and emphasizes obligations and duties in re-
sponse to rights and interests, a focus on vulnerability instead emphasizes the 
universality of the vulnerable condition that the state must support in a holis-
tic—as opposed to a necessarily divisible—manner. Thereby, Martha Fine-
man’s vulnerability theory provides a framework for resolving the tension be-
tween the competing rights introduced in this article.242 
2. Relational Rights and Interests: Supporting Individuals Within 
Relationships 
Although the theory of universal vulnerability that Fineman introduces 
demands that we start with the premise of our universal need for state assis-
tance, rights and rights talk are still a fundamental and compelling tool for de-
lineating what the state must do for its citizenry and the ways in which the state 
must not interfere with its citizenry depending on whether we are dealing with 
a positive right under the law to state action or a right to freedom from state in-
terference. Focus on rights is unlikely to be easily abandoned in favor of focus 
on vulnerability. Another way to resolve the tension between caregiver rights 
and children’s rights is to focus on relational rights as opposed to individualis-
                                                        
237  See Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13 
NEV. L.J. 619, 619–20 (2013). 
238  Id. at 620. 
239  See Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U. 
FLA. L. REV. 627, 647–48 (1987). (arguing that when caregiver and children’s rights conflict, 
the more vulnerable party’s rights should prevail—usually children). 
240  Fineman, supra note 237, at 636. 
241  Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 212, at 1, 3–4, 8. 
242  Id. 
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tic rights.243 Using the theory of relational rights has the benefit of remaining in 
the rights talk conversation as opposed to beginning with the demand for social 
welfare from the state due to universal vulnerability. However, the outcome of 
the need to focus on dependence and relationships is similar. 
The relational perspective on children’s rights is distinct from the right to 
relationships and from relationship rights, which are more comparable to group 
rights. The right to relationships is still an individualistic right that can attach to 
both individual children and adults. It is the right of the individual to have a re-
lationship with another person, such as a caregiver.244 The relational perspec-
tive on rights is also not about rights that belong to a relationship. Relational 
rights do not protect two individuals together. Rather, the rights attach to the 
individuals, but the duty to the individual comes in the form of support for the 
relationship. Relational rights are about the responsibility of the state to protect 
and support relationships in order to protect and support individual interde-
pendent children and caregivers.245 That the rights attach to individuals and 
flow to relationships does not mean the individuals’ rights are compromised. 
Due to their interdependency, in most circumstances, the only way to effective-
ly support and protect these individuals is through their relationships. 
The basic premise behind relational rights is that when it comes to chil-
dren’s rights, instead of trying to decipher some identifiable notion of best in-
terests, the focus of children’s advocacy and the corresponding duties placed on 
the state should be on setting preconditions for healthy and beneficial relation-
ships that children need.246 As Martha Minow inquires, in suggesting relational 
rights as the premise for children’s rights, “[w]hat legal rules governing child 
custody, education, and child support would promote settings where children 
thrive? . . . [W]hat rules would promote adults’ abilities to create these set-
tings?”247 Children’s advocacy should be viewed through the lens of interde-
pendent relationships because such interdependent relationships are at the heart 
of what it means to meet the needs of children and caregivers. It is this complex 
perspective on families—individuals within an interdependent community—
that best describes the relational perspective on children’s rights I am advanc-
ing: “A conception of relational rights and responsibilities . . . would not regard 
                                                        
243  Minow & Shanley, supra note 25, at 23; see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1825–39 (1998) (discussion 
of relational rights and duties in tort law); C. Harry Hui, Measurement of Individualism-
Collectivism, 22 J. RES. PERSONALITY 17, 17–19 (1988); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. 
Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1230, 1278 (1998). 
244  See, e.g., Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, supra note 26, 2168, 2172–73 (dis-
cussing the right of children to have caregiving relationships due to their developmental 
needs); see also DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 84 (arguing for the rights 
of children to have relationships with caregivers). 
245  See supra notes 36–61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the way rights create 
duties upon the state. 
246  Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 25, at 23. 
247  Id. 
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‘rights’ as belonging to individuals and arising from the imperative of self-
preservation, but rather would view rights as claims grounded in and arising 
from human relationships of varying degrees of intimacy, what Kenneth Karst 
has called ‘intimate associations.’ ”248 
This perspective on rights as relational has been advocated broadly by Jen-
nifer Nedelsky, who argues for a relational approach to organizing our collec-
tive lives in a constitutive manner and to approach legal questions from the 
starting assumption that our human selves are in interaction with others.249 She 
sharply criticizes all individualistic accounts of rights and autonomy as identi-
ties and capacities, which, she argues, are not comprehensible in isolation from 
their relationships.250 Therefore, from a relational perspective it is logical and 
sensible to consider children’s rights in conjunction with caregiver rights. 
IV. DOCTRINAL REUNIFICATION OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS WITH CAREGIVER 
RIGHTS IN THE LAW OF CUSTODY  
The question is therefore how, in practice, to balance the different compo-
nents of children’s rights—parental privacy, quasi-civil rights, and dependency 
rights provided by the state—with caregiver rights, when the goal is to focus on 
the supportive relationships that children need. And, importantly, how to incor-
porate the state and legislature in regulating and shaping this need for care. 
Broadly, civil rights are more straightforward to enforce in the liberal, individ-
ualistic tradition, but even such rights should be enforced keeping in mind the 
relationship in which they will continue to be supported. Yet, the need for care 
and the tension between state and parental caregivers in providing such care is 
more complex when the law focuses on individuals and not relationships. The 
need for care and the existence within interdependent frameworks makes the 
dominant, individualistic, liberty-based perspective on rights an impossible fit 
for children. 
The child, an individual with his own rights and interests, is also an indeli-
ble part of a relationship with his parents, and when parents fail, the child is 
dependent on the state. So too, the caregiver, an adult with rights and interests 
of her own, is also an indelible part of a dependency relationship when it comes 
to caring for a child. The interdependency, for both the caring parent and the 
child, is not only physical, but emotional. Physically, a caregiver must provide 
safety, shelter, and care for the dependent child. Emotionally, caregivers’ own 
choices are often intertwined not only with their own needs, but also with the 
needs of their children. Choices that might appear to be selfish could result in 
more emotional stability for a parent, which would improve parenting. Separat-
                                                        
248  Minow & Shanley, supra note 25, at 23 (citing Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Inti-
mate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 626 (1980)); see Bartlett, supra note 25, at 315 (“We 
may also want to take account of the different degrees of relationship that have been 
formed.”). 
249  NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 55. 
250  Id. at 121. 
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ing out caregiver choices that are just for the caregiver’s sake and those that are 
for children is complex and may be impossible. This symbiotic relationship is 
central to parenthood both from a normative and descriptive perspective. 
The answer lies in shifting from an oppositional rights discourse to deline-
ating legal principles that govern interactions between these individuals and 
their rights in a manner that best supports their interdependent relationships. 
Thus, the key is not to decide whose interests trump whose, but rather to look 
for guiding principles that can strike a balance between the potentially conflict-
ing and competing concerns.251 I will provide some concrete examples of how a 
reunited perspective on care and caregiver would affect and alter the law of 
child custody. Most essentially, the law should reject the use of the best inter-
ests standard to the greatest extent possible. Moreover, substantively, the law 
would look to support caregivers along with children. The law should focus on 
nurturing relationships as opposed to focusing on the division between them. 
A. Supporting a Variety of Care Relationships 
Caregivers are not always parents. Children receive their care from a varie-
ty of sources. Although parents are still the primary providers of care, care is 
multifaceted and this article’s focus is on caregivers, not on parents alone. 
Moreover, the focus on care is not an absolute measure. There is a variety of 
levels of care, and these different levels can be recognized for what they are 
and supported in degrees as opposed to absolute rights. A relational perspective 
should support a variety of forms of relationships from a variety of care provid-
ers.252 
Third parties, such as grandparents, step-parents, same-sex partners, and 
others who are not formal parents, increasingly seek custodial rights or visita-
tion with children based on their caregiving activities.253 I have argued for 
providing parental status and rights to functional third-party caregivers because 
such status makes sense for children, caregivers, and parents.254 These func-
tional caregivers provide significant care over a long period of time that is suf-
ficient to meet threshold requirements for becoming a functional parent.255 
                                                        
251  Contra Rutherford, supra note 239, at 647. Jane Rutherford has argued for support for 
family rights alongside individual rights, and when the rights of individuals in the family 
conflict—husband’s rights with a wife’s or children’s with their parents—the weaker and 
more vulnerable party’s rights should prevail. Id. The focus of such a “rule” is on the nature 
of the parties individually and not on the functioning of the relationship and thus does not 
comply with the framework of relational rights that I promote. The rule to favor weaker par-
ties may work as between men and women but not as between parents and children; this the-
ory does not sufficiently appreciate interdependency of parent and child, as the weaker par-
ty—the child—is not necessarily poised to express or to have his will carried out without 
support from a parent. 
252  See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text. 
253  See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text. 
254  See generally Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13. 
255  Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13, at 442–43. 
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Children benefit from third-party care and parents do as well.256 Legal status 
and rights benefit functional parents by giving recognition and value to the care 
or financial support they provide.257 From a relational perspective, as opposed 
to an individualistic rights perspective, there is less of a focus on separating out 
rights and interests and pitting the rights of different caregivers against each 
other. The focus is on supporting these relationships, whether formal and bio-
logical or functional and care-based. 
However, functional parenting is different in practice and in theory from 
formal parenting. There are significant benefits to the flexible and diverse man-
ner in which such relationships develop and meet the needs of children.258 
Moreover, there are many different kinds of people that might qualify as func-
tional caregivers by providing for the needs of children. Functional relations are 
not as stable, predictable, identifiable, or easily assignable as formal parenting 
relationships.259 They also create a potential multiplicity of claims that can up-
set the stable, private lives of children through state and court intervention.260 
Thus, for the sake of the children who are the primary beneficiaries of func-
tional caregivers, but also in acknowledgement of the different potential con-
cerns involved, we should heed the benefits of functional parenthood without 
equating it to formal parenthood.261 
Functional caregivers need status and recognition to best care for children, 
to maintain relationships despite conflicts with parents, and to facilitate child-
care that is supported by formal parents.262 For instance, functional parents 
need status in order to obtain authority for health care decisions and to act as 
legal guardians.263 Functional parents should not be disposed of when primary 
caregivers disagree with them if their attachments are supporting the children. 
On the other hand, it also makes sense to support these caregiving relationships 
in a way that not only facilitates their continuity and stability but also minimiz-
es tension with formal parents.264 Power struggles between formal and func-
tional caregivers can create conflict between parental figures that has been 
demonstrated to be a primary risk factor in undermining children’s well-
being.265 Differentiation and a clear demarcation of obligations and responsibil-
ity for final decisions can give primary caretakers the support they need without 
challenging their primary parental status.266 A differentiated functional parent 
                                                        
256  Id. at 439–41. 
257  Id. at 441. 
258  Id. at 455–61. 
259  Id. at 455, 461–66. 
260  Id. at 463. 
261  Id. at 454–55. 
262  Id. at 441. 
263  Id. at 439–40. 
264  Id. at 461–62. 
265  Id. at 466; see infra note 297 and accompanying text for studies that demonstrate that 
familial conflict harms children. 
266  Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13, at 466. 
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status would not override an ongoing formal parenthood relationship, but could 
also support secondary relationships with functional caregivers by providing 
rights to visitation or other subsets of parental rights even if a parent objects.267 
Grandparents and other biological kin, however, including biological birth 
parents post-adoption, do not necessarily meet the threshold minimum require-
ments for determining functional parenthood and thus would not be entitled to 
functional parent status.268 They may be functional parents, based on the level 
of functional care they provide, or they may simply be loving grandparents and 
not substitute parents.269 Still, biological kin may seek state assistance from 
courts in obtaining access to grandchildren, often due to death of their child.270 
In Troxel v. Granville, the Court dealt squarely with the potential conflict be-
tween parent, child, and state.271 Grandparents sought visitation with their 
grandchildren through state interference because the grandchildren’s mother 
was not providing them with the access they desired after their son’s death.272 
The trial court held that it was in the best interests of the children to continue 
the relationship with their grandparents, as provided by state statute, as the rela-
tionship appeared to have a positive impact on their lives.273 However, the Su-
preme Court held that any such “best interests” reasoning was a violation of pa-
rental privacy rights.274 Instead, greater weight should be given to the fact that 
parents can determine what is in their child’s best interests.275 The case was 
sent back to the appellate court and the lower courts have had a dizzying time 
figuring out what the Supreme Court judgment meant and what standards might 
be considered constitutional.276 
Interpreting Troxel from a relational rights perspective, there are two issues 
that need to be considered. First, best interests should already include such spe-
cial considerations of parental prerogatives and liberties because low tension 
and parental privacy are part of what helps children thrive.277 It is usually not in 
the best interests of children for the state to force a relationship that parents ob-
ject to and that creates tension in the home. If the Supreme Court is saying that 
                                                        
267  Id. at 467. 
268  Cf. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, supra note 26 (arguing for rights to caregiv-
ing relationships but only when caregivers are “primary”). 
269  Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13, at 442–43. 
270  See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60–61 (2000). 
271  Id. 
272  Id. 
273  Id. at 61–63. 
274  Id. at 72–73. 
275  Id. at 72. 
276  See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 337, 396–401 (2002); Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applica-
tions of Troxel v. Granville and the Courts’ Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation 
Statutes Unconstitutional, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 14, 15 (2003). 
277  See supra Parts I.B, II.A. 
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parental prerogatives merit extra weight due to parental rights, the question be-
comes how much weight? 
Second, focus should be given to the effect of enforcing the relationship on 
the interaction between child and parent, child and grandparent, and parent and 
grandparent. As long as the primary caregiver is still acting as primary, if the 
care provided by the grandparent is important to the child’s well-being, such 
visitation should be continued despite parental objections in recognition of the 
relational principle of supporting different forms and degrees of relationships. 
However, if the grandparent relationship has not been important in providing 
care, and there is deep-seated, unresolvable tension between grandparent and 
parent that will cause harm to the primary caregiving relationship, then grand-
parent interaction would not be worth supporting at the cost of harming the re-
lationship with formal parents. 
This same analysis could apply in providing birth parents with access to 
children post-adoption, if not already provided for by agreement, in order to 
support children’s relationships with parents, even if adoption is the best option 
for the primary caregiving relationship.278 Particularly with regard to older 
children, birth parents’ relationships with adopted children may be significant 
and should not be discarded to the detriment of the children. Attachment from 
past caregiving is the primary indicator of the need to support such ongoing, yet 
differentiated care relationships, such as in the case of post-adoption contact,279 
relationships with long-term foster parents, or relationships with illegal immi-
grant parents. Other factors may be relevant as well; for instance, biological 
and cultural connections to a child can create a strong desire to care and pro-
vide for a child. Such cultural and biological affinities should be encouraged, as 
is the case for Native American children and children born to inmates, so as to 
foster these needed caregiving relations and cultural identities. If primary for-
mal parents are given defined rights including primary physical custody, the 
vision is for other attached caregivers, whether due to past care, biological af-
finity, or cultural kin-ties, to also be given an opportunity to have a caregiving 
relationship with a child to that child’s benefit. Such secondary caregivers may 
interfere with the exclusive, binary parental relationship envisioned in the nu-
clear family, but for many children such care networks can be extremely bene-
ficial, and thus parental rights should be weakened for the sake of these rela-
tionships. From a relational perspective a child can benefit from a myriad of 
connections both biological and cultural as well as based on caregiving attach-
ments. 
In sum, opening up the network of care to other committed long-term care-
givers makes sense from a child-focused, relational perspective when children 
benefit from such care.280 If, however, the secondary relationship cannot be 
                                                        
278  See supra Part II.B.3. 
279  See generally Appell, supra note 168, at 102–36 (discussing the importance of relation-
ships between children and biological kin post-adoption). 
280  Murray, supra note 106, at 454–455. 
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sustained in parallel to the primary relationship, this reality would have to be 
taken into account and likely discontinued unless the care relationship is signif-
icant enough to rise to the level of functional parent, in which case, allowing 
such a relationship despite formal parental objections would be more impera-
tive. However, I believe that a societal and legal embrace of the reality of net-
worked care, along with clear delineations of power and control, can usually 
avoid power struggles and allow adults to provide for multiple care relation-
ships that are beneficial to children. 
B. Caregiver Presumptions 
When two fit parents both want custody of a child, the custody dispute is 
bound to be antagonistic and difficult.281 The situation often involves two lov-
ing parents who are angry with each other and longing to maintain close rela-
tionships with their children. Thus, custody disputes can be fierce and the ensu-
ing conflict is sure to be detrimental to the children involved.282 Too often, 
children are used as pawns in custody disputes and do not have enough oppor-
tunity to speak their minds. Moreover, custody disputes can be incredibly ex-
pensive, involving complex and conflicting evidence and testimony.283 Ulti-
mately, it is incredibly hard to optimize between two loving parents even if 
they have different parenting styles. The best interests standard, which is both 
broad and inherently at tension with itself due to incorporation of both the ben-
efits of parental privacy and the benefits of state intervention, gives little if any 
guidance to making determinations between two fit parents. 
Between two formal parents, the relational perspective I am describing ar-
gues for supporting a variety of degrees and types of caregiving relationships. 
Thus, well-defined, differentiated statuses that minimize tension and conflict 
between parental figures, which have been demonstrated to be a primary factor 
in undermining children’s well-being,284 could also apply to primary and sec-
ondary caregivers in a fashion similar to that suggested for functional caregiv-
ers and secondary caregivers, like grandparents. As described above, a variety 
of intimate relationships can be recognized, but differences should also be tak-
en into account in allocating rights and responsibilities. In the context of custo-
dy disputes between two formal fit parents, this means that, absent an agree-
ment to parent jointly, primary and secondary custodians should be clearly 
                                                        
281  See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the best interests standard used in custody disputes 
between fit parents. 
282  See, e.g., ROBERT E. EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT 1–4 
(2d ed. 1999); Yongmin Sun, Family Environment and Adolescents’ Well-Being Before and 
After Parents’ Marital Disruption: A Longitudinal Analysis, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 697, 
698 (2001). 
283  See supra Part II.A. 
284  See Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 47–52 (discussing different 
approaches to custody determinations and analyzing their effects on tension and conflict be-
tween parental figures). 
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delineated, with distinguishable rights and responsibilities, but that both rela-
tionships should be sustained and supported in a rigorous manner. 
In a previous article, I advocated for the primary caretaker standard in cus-
tody decisions between two fit parents.285 This standard is only applicable when 
a primary caretaker can be identified. However, despite contentious litigation 
on the matter, and conflicting studies, many estimate that in most cases a pri-
mary caretaker can be identified.286 The primary caretaker can be ascertained 
by affirmative day-to-day activities as well as limited participation in the work 
place.287 When such a caretaker can be identified, he or she should have pre-
sumptive custody that can be rebutted by agreement to share custody or by 
demonstrating significant harm to the child. Primary custody should constitute 
anywhere from sixty to eighty percent of physical custody of a child, depending 
on agreement and living situations of the parents, and leaving substantial visita-
tion for a secondary caregiver.288 Although this suggestion for a presumption 
remains unpopular, and states instead rely heavily on the best interests stand-
ard, I make this argument again from a child-centered relational perspective. If 
not for the sake of caregivers, then perhaps from the perspective of children 
such a presumption can gain more support. 
I argue for this presumption for several reasons. First, I believe that it is 
best for children to live with primary caregivers because of the validity of the 
attachment theory developed by Goldstein, Solnit, and Freund.289 Children 
bond to primary caregivers and need continuation of these important relation-
ships. Second, I believe that unless parents can work together in a consistent 
and low-conflict manner, it is best for children that there is a primary custodian 
                                                        
285  See id. at 47–56. 
286  See id. at 2 & n.3; see also CATHERINE R. ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND 
THE MOBILIZATION OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: RIGHTS ON LEAVE 4–5 (2010). 
287  See Price v. Price, 611 N.W.2d 425, 430–36 (S.D. 2000) (“The primary caretaker can be 
identified by determining which parent invested predominant time, care and consistency in 
raising the child.” (internal quotation markes omitted)); Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recogni-
tion, supra note 13, at 2. 
288  Marygold S. Melli, The American Law Institute Principles of Family Dissolution, the 
Approximation Rule and Shared-Parenting, 25 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 347, 353 (2005). 
289  JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986); see Laufer-
Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 48; see also, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 
203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing expert testimony on the attachment 
theory); David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 916–17 (W. Va. 1989) (“Substantial re-
search has confirmed that young children, as a result of intimate interaction, form a unique 
bond with their primary caretaker. This unique attachment to a primary caretaker is an essen-
tial cornerstone of a child’s sense of security and healthy emotional development. . . . Thus, 
the young child’s welfare can be best served by preserving the child’s relationship with the 
primary caretaker parent.”); Chambers, supra note 134, at 530 (“The original bond of the 
child with the primary caretaker is believed to have an important continuing effect on the 
child’s ability to pass through each stage with success”); Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the 
Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 799 (1985) (“The principal at-
tachment figure is that person who is most responsive to the child’s signals of biological 
needs and who initiates and maintains social interactions with the child.”). 
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and decision maker to resolve conflicts and make important decisions.290 Third, 
I believe that there is a tendency for one parent to do more of the work than the 
other in raising children, and despite agreements made in court, one parent—
the primary caregiver prior to the divorce—will still do most of the caregiving, 
so that parent will need the child support that primary custody involves.291 Fi-
nally, as between two fit parents, I believe that it is fair to give the presumption 
to the primary caregiver to properly value the caregiving work he or she has 
provided.292 Just as the primary earner keeps the value of this earning potential 
for his or her life after divorce, so too would the primary caregiver retain a ben-
efit for the value of the care work that he or she has provided.293 Although pri-
mary earner support is also essential and should continue to be essential in the 
parenting relationship, it is also different in kind than caregiving and should be 
treated as such. 
All these rationales support children’s rights and interests, both directly 
and indirectly. Giving a primary caregiver presumptive weight when it comes 
to custody does not give her rights at the detriment of her children. From a rela-
tional perspective, the act of giving care needs to be supported because of the 
relational nature of children’s rights. Caregiving should be valued and support-
ed because it is what children need and thus the parents who provide the sup-
port to children should be supported as well.294 This will both reward and in-
centivize caregivers who provide needed care. Attempts to isolate the interests 
of the child from caretakers fail to appreciate the interdependent nature of care-
giver and child well-being.295 Supporting care supports the children who are 
dependent upon caregiving relationships. Primary earners also have relation-
ships with children that should be supported but, as they are different in nature, 
their differences should be taken into account. Based more on financial support 
than physical support, the relationship must be continued but need not depend 
on the same amount of constant physical interaction. 
In situations where parents are substantively splitting care work and a pri-
mary caregiver cannot be identified, the presumption does not help and efforts 
to find a primary caretaker should not be too rigorous. When the caregiving 
functions are equal or near equal, it is not worth fighting about in court as liti-
gation will only increase tension and joint caregiving work should be incentiv-
                                                        
290  Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 54–55. 
291  Id. at 53. 
292  Id. at 47–49. 
293  Id. at 58–59. 
294  See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. 
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 192 (1992); Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the 
Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year 
Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 450–51 (1990); 
discussion supra Parts IIIA–B. 
295  See Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination, supra note 12, at 117–18 (arguing that prefer-
ring a primary caretaker in custody disputes will harm the interests of children unless it can 
be found that it is in children’s best interests to remain with primary caretakers). 
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ized and supported. If a joint caregiving arrangement can be continued after di-
vorce or by non-married parents by agreement of cooperating adults, it should 
be fully supported. However, if there is significant conflict and caregivers can-
not work cooperatively, one parent has to be chosen and these are clearly the 
hardest cases to decide. Studies demonstrate that the two variables most im-
portant to the well-being of children are: (1) low levels of conflict between pa-
rental figures, and (2) financial stability.296 Clearly, fighting, uncooperative 
parents cannot easily “share” the raising of children.297 In order to minimize 
tension and ongoing conflict to which a child may be exposed in a manner that 
can be harmful, one parent should be chosen as primary legal custodian, al-
though it should be ensured that the secondary custodian maintains a relation-
ship with the child. The choice should not be made by “best interests,” but by 
focus on the nature and strength of the relationship between the child and each 
parent. In addition, in such cases, particularly for older children, child’s prefer-
ences should weigh heavily in determining the strength of the relationship and 
who should be preferred for custody. 
Once a primary custodian is chosen, liberal visitation should be provided, 
maximizing the relationship between the children and the secondary custodian. 
Additionally, once awards are made in the rare cases where such custody ar-
rangements are not made by agreement, parties can then sit down and rework 
the arrangement, because bargaining will be made easier by the certainty of a 
legal decision. Both primary and secondary relationships should be stressed as 
crucial to the child’s well-being. The imposition of some hierarchy supports 
working relationships, as there is a clear and final decision maker and demar-
                                                        
296  Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 207, 238–39 (2010) (discussing and citing studies of how exposure to high levels of 
conflict and stress negatively impacts children); see E. Mavis Hetherington, Should We Stay 
Together for the Sake of the Children, in COPING WITH DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING, AND 
REMARRIAGE: A RISK AND RESILIENCY PERSPECTIVE, 93, 93–116 (E. Mavis Hetherington 
ed.,1999); Paul. R. Amato & Bruce Keith, Parental Divorce and the Well-Being of Children: 
A Meta-Analysis, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 26, 38 (1991) (“The [family conflict] perspective as-
sumes that divorce affects children primarily because of the conflict that occurs between 
parents before and during the separation period. . . . [Meta-analysis] results strongly support 
a conflict perspective; not only were children in high-conflict intact families considerably 
worse off than children in low-conflict intact families, but they also exhibited lower levels of 
well-being than did children in divorced families.”); Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody and 
Visitation Decisions in Domestic Violence Cases: Legal Trends, Risk Factors, and Safety 
Concerns (Revised 2007), NAT’L ONLINE RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 
http://www.vawnet.org/applied-research-papers/print-document.php?doc_id=1134 (last vis-
ited Dec. 19, 2014) (“Enthusiasm for joint custody in the early 1980s was fueled by studies 
of couples who were highly motivated to ‘make it work.’ This enthusiasm has waned in re-
cent years, in part because of social science findings. . . . [For example,] Johnston concluded 
from her [most recent] review of research that ‘highly conflictual parents’ (not necessarily 
violent) had a poor prognosis for becoming cooperative parents,” and “[t]here is increasing 
evidence, however, that children of divorce have more problems because of the conflict be-
tween the parents before the divorce and not because of the divorce itself.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
297  Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition, supra note 13, at 54–56. 
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cated rights and responsibilities. However, secondary caregivers are important 
and need to be given rights to significant visitation and consultation regarding 
legal decision making for major life decisions. 
C. Modification and Relocation 
Modification and relocation cases are different than initial custody cases 
because they are brought after an initial award, usually due to some change in 
circumstances. The petitioning parent is requesting that the court move a child 
from the primary custody of one fit parent to the primary custody of the other 
fit parent. Because a custody agreement will likely have already been made, 
modification and relocation decisions can cause great upheaval to a child if cus-
tody is transferred.298 
The typical standard in modification cases is that there must be significant 
change of circumstances that justifies a change in custody in the child’s best 
interests.299 In relocation cases, the issue is that the primary custodian wants to 
leave town and this change is usually presumed to be significant. Thus, the tra-
ditional inquiry is whether the relocation is done in bad faith and will cause 
significant harm to the child, and the courts will allow the custodial parent 
freedom of movement in most circumstances where a good faith reason for 
moving is proffered by the primary custodian.300 
A relational perspective must consider two factors. First, it is important to 
cement the secondary custodian’s relationship with a child. A secondary care-
giver, if fit, should have a protected and significant relationship with the child. 
Although I support recognition of the primary caretaker, the secondary status 
should also be protected as well. The relational perspective I describe supports 
hierarchy and assignment of roles to limit conflict and tension caused by power 
struggles and uncertainty in a manner that still allows both caregivers to have a 
substantive relationship with a child. 
                                                        
298  See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Fit to Be Tied: On Custody, Discretion, and Sexual Orientation, 
46 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 866 (1997); Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The 
Best Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 123–24 
(1997). 
299  See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.20.110(a) (West 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-204(c) 
(West Supp. 2014) (“A court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, 
custody and visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material 
change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the modification 
would be in the best interests of the children . . . .”); JUDITH AREEN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 948 
(6th ed. 2012). 
300  See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-13 (2013) (granting the custodial parent the right to 
change residence, unless it would negatively affect the rights or welfare of the child); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36-6-108(d) (West Supp. 2014) (as long as a good faith reason is proffered by 
the custodial parent, the opposing parent must demonstrate harm to prevent the move with 
the child); Goldmeier v. Lepselter, 598 A.2d 482, 486 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Morgan v. 
Morgan, 12 A.3d 192, 200 (N.J. 2011) (petitioner seeking relocation must prove “a good 
faith reason for the move and that the child will not suffer from it.”); AM. LAW INST., supra 
note 107 § 2.17(4)(a)(ii) (providing a list of good faith reasons for a parent’s move). 
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Second, caregiver actions should not be modeled or judged on an ideal 
“best interests” optimization scale. Some parental choices are based solely on 
what parents think is best for their children, while others, of course, are more 
selfish.301 Still, even when parents are not making choices solely for the sake of 
children, their children’s needs may be considered to some extent. Even paren-
tal liberty rights that seem directly at odds with a child’s interests must be 
judged in the context of a relationship. When parental choices seem subopti-
mal, if they do not cause significant harm to children they should not affect 
custody, because parental well-being is inseparably connected to the quality of 
care parents are able to provide and the stability of the parental home.302 Judg-
ing and interfering with those choices can negatively affect the care provided. 
For instance, choosing a non-family-friendly car or going out late with friends 
instead of being home every night with children may seem like selfish choices 
to be held against a parent. However, parental well-being and freedom is an 
important contributor to the provision of adequate care, and such choices 
should not be examined too harshly. Parents need support for their care, not in-
tense scrutiny and judgment. Punishing parents for suboptimal choices that do 
not cause significant harm isolates and separates the children from the caregiv-
er and ultimately harms ongoing relationships. Indeed, trying to determine who 
is at fault or condemning certain parental choices as less than the “best” for a 
child’s well-being mirrors a fault system of divorce. In many ways, the parent 
who chooses to leave or abandon the marriage can be argued to have done the 
most harm to the child. Yet, we have abandoned fault in divorce because it im-
pacts child custody in a contentious and potentially harmful manner.303 Policies 
can and should be put into place to educate, inform, and encourage parents in a 
way that advances children’s interests,304 but we should be cautious about judg-
ing, punishing, and interfering with parental choices that do not amount to 
abuse or neglect, because this impacts ongoing care relationships by creating 
hostility and tension. 
Recent legislation and case law have moved the law in modification and re-
location cases closer to a renewed best interests analysis by purportedly focus-
ing on the rights of the child and thus necessitating such renewed child-
centered inquiries.305 However, this move towards best interests is not good for 
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303  See, e.g., Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 296, at 231–32. 
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children. There is not only indeterminacy in the original custody decision but 
indeterminacy that can potentially be multiplied each time the non-custodial 
parent wants to challenge the judgment.306 In modification cases, the relational 
rights theory and the two factors discussed above would argue for keeping the 
standard for modification high in cases of two fit parents, certainly only allow-
ing for changes in primary custody where significant harm can be demonstrated 
by the petitioner and this harm stems from the primary caregiving relationship. 
To end the primary caregiving relationship altogether, abuse or neglect must be 
proven. As both relationships should be considered significant, a high threshold 
would have to be met to alter the balance of time between two fit caregivers. 
The two factors described above from the relational perspective—
promotion of secondary care relationships and avoidance of judging and pun-
ishing caregiver choices—would seem to contradict each other in the case of 
relocation. Moving away from a secondary custodian will harm and affect the 
nature of that important secondary caregiving relationship, particularly if the 
secondary caregiver is involved in the day-to-day care of the child. However, 
removing custody from a parent who wants to relocate seems to punish care-
givers for their choices in a manner that isolates the caregiver from the care he 
or she provides. In such cases, it should first be determined by the court wheth-
er the secondary custodian can retain the same level and depth of caregiving on 
an alternative schedule that perhaps gives the secondary caregiver more time in 
the summer and vacations. If so, relocation should be allowed if significant 
change can be avoided, and caregiver choices should be respected to the extent 
possible. Second, the judge should examine whether the relocation would cause 
significant harm to the child. A typical relocation should not cause significant 
harm to the child, as many people move, but if there has been instability in the 
child’s life due to many moves over the course of a child’s lifetime, it would be 
necessary to modify the custody arrangement so as to allow the child to remain 
with the parent who is not relocating. 
If neither of the two inquiries delineated above provides clear resolution of 
the issue, and the relocation will significantly diminish the relationship with the 
secondary custodian and the child, the primary custodian should be encouraged 
to refrain from relocation and perhaps financial adjustments can be ordered by 
the court to cure the need for relocation. The primary custodian should not be 
threatened with removal of the children, as in most cases she would rather re-
tain custody than move. The court also cannot deny her the right to move; but, 
the court can refuse to alter the visitation schedule that sustains the secondary 
custodian’s relationship with the child, leaving it to the parents to negotiate a 
different schedule in order to make the relocation possible for the custodial par-
                                                                                                                                
cessitating a court order or consent from the other parent so that a custodial parent may relo-
cate with their children). 
306  See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2003, 2025 (2014). 
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ent. In caring for children, parents must be able to come to such arrangements 
and usually do. 
CONCLUSION 
Focusing on children’s needs is of the utmost importance in modern family 
law. Nothing I have written in this article is intended to detract from its im-
portance. All three kinds of children’s rights and interests I have addressed 
need protection and consideration. However, the only way to make headway in 
advancing children’s advocacy is to move away from opposition and individu-
alism which have become inherent in best interest inquiries and focus instead 
on the actual interdependency and relationships that are so important for chil-
dren. This change in focus will not weaken children’s rights; it will only ad-
vance them more effectively and in a manner that is easier for society to em-
brace and which better reflects reality. This article provides a new relational 
framework for analyzing children’s rights and interests in a manner that allows 
us to consider traditional family law doctrines, like the primary caregiver doc-
trine, through a new child-based relations lens. For the most part, children do 
not need the right to be left alone, nor do they need the state to interfere in rela-
tionships with family members. Indeed, it is the fear of such liberty rights that 
makes embracing children’s rights so difficult. Rather, what children need from 
the state is more support of the relationships and care that best serves them as 
members of a life-sustaining relationship. Such support can create a seismic 
shift in policy initiatives and family law, and beyond that will ultimately in-
crease support of relationships for the sake of children and in the name of chil-
dren’s rights. 
